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Introduction 
 
Muslims are the single largest religious minority in the UK today (Alam and 
Husband, 2006).  Since the disturbances in various Northern towns in 2001, 
the events in the United States on the 11th September 2001 and the events in 
the UK on the 7th July 2005, the Muslim population in Britain has become 
surrounded by discussions on terrorism, conflict, radicalisation and 
segregation.  This has led to a position where communities have arguably 
become stigmatised as ‘threatening’ (Werbner, 2005) and much of the recent 
literature has focused on preventing extremism.  
 
In February 2007 Communities and Local Government (CLG) began a 
programme which aimed to support initiatives around community engagement 
and social cohesion, which specifically appeared to deal with the development 
of violent extremism. According to the CLG this will be broadly achieved by: 
 
- Establishing communities in which Muslims identify themselves with 
and are accepted by the wider community; 
 
- Supporting communities that reject extremist ideology and actively 
condemn violent extremism; 
 
- Isolating violent extremism activity and supporting and co-operating 
with the Police and security services; and 
 
- Capacity building communities to develop mechanisms to deal with 
problems where they arise and supporting diversionary activity for 
those at risk. 
 
In late 2007 Newcastle City Council commissioned Pasha Associates in 
partnership with the University of Salford to explore these issues broadly with 
relation to the local Muslim community in Newcastle.  More specifically, the 
Council wanted the research team to consider the following issues: 
 
• The Muslim community in Newcastle, including ethnic, cultural and 
theological groupings; 
 
• The diversity and dynamics of local Muslim communities; 
 
• The key local, national and global issues for Muslim communities; 
 
• The socio-economic profile of Muslim communities; 
 
• Leadership, governance and engagement within Muslim communities; 
 
• Experience of racism and Islamophobia; 
 
• The role of younger people within the Muslim communities; 
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• The role of mosques within these communities; 
 
• Key issues relating to young people; 
 
• Key issues relating to women; 
 
• Inter-generational relationships within Muslim families and 
communities; 
 
• Muslim community views on violent extremist political Islamic groups; 
and 
 
• Perceptions of relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities. 
 
In recognition of the broad based objectives for the study, discussions were 
held between the research team and Council officers regarding identifying 
those objectives which were felt should be given greater priority.  It was 
agreed that more detailed attention should be given to the issues affecting 
Muslim women, young men and the role of the mosques within the 
community. 
 
The report provides an overview of these issues based on both analysis of 
relevant secondary local and national information and direct engagement with 
different sections of the Muslim community: women; young people; Imams 
and other leading members of the local mosques.  
 
The report is structured in the following way.  Chapter 1 provides an overview 
of the Muslim community in the UK and Newcastle.  Chapter 2 gives an 
overview of the factors of theo-political influences for Muslims in Britain while 
Chapter 3 considers effective engagement with Muslim communities based on 
a literature and good practice review.  These three initial chapters provide the 
context for the report in terms of a backdrop to a review of local information 
about Muslim communities in Newcastle (Chapter 4) and the findings from the 
community engagement exercises with the different sections of the Muslim 
community in Newcastle (Chapter 5).  The final element of the report (Chapter 
6) provides a synopsis of the issues emerging from the consultation events 
and offers advice on how to take these issues forward. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of the Muslim community in the UK 
and Newcastle 
 
Until the 2001 Census there was no systematic data on the emergent 
religions in the UK.  The question enquiring about an individual’s religion was 
optional, but 92% of respondents provided an answer.  The Census was 
adjusted for a 2% ‘undercount’.  Although there has been some criticism of 
the Census data, this still remains the most comprehensive source of data on 
faith communities.  It shows that Muslims accounted for 3.1 % of the 
population (a total of 1.5 million Muslims) in England, compared to 72% 
Christians.  Most people from emerging faith communities (not exclusively 
Muslim) live in London, East and West Midlands, Eastern Lancashire, Greater 
Manchester and West Yorkshire.  
 
‘Muslims tend to be less ethnically homogeneous than other faith 
communities.  For the Sikh and Hindu community, for example, just over 96% 
indentify themselves as Asian or British Asian.  The comparative figure for the 
Muslim community, however, is 74%.  In addition, 12% of the Muslim 
population identified themselves as White; 7 % are Black; 4% are Chinese or 
Other Ethnic Group; and 4% are Mixed (which includes having one white 
parent or other mixed parentage).  This heterogeneity is particularly prevalent 
in London; however, in the North of England the Muslim community is 
predominantly South Asian (mostly Pakistani and Bangladeshi).  There are 
more Muslim males than females, indeed, Census data 2001 suggests that 
there are 1067 Muslim males per every 1000 Muslim females (taken from 
Beckford et al., 2006).   
 
According to the Census 2001 within Newcastle-upon-Tyne there were 9,430 
Muslims – 3.6% of the overall population. 
 
Socio-economic and demographic information  
 
Based on information derived from the 2001 Census Muslims are more likely 
to be disadvantaged than other faith communities:  
 
“They display low rates of labour market participation, the highest 
male unemployment rate, larger families, a higher percentage in 
social housing, the highest incidence of over-crowding and are 
most likely to live in deprived localities.  The percentage with 
higher educational qualifications is low and the percentage 
working in blue-collar occupations is high” (Beckford et al, 2006, 
p. 10). 
 
Comparing these indicators across different faith communities, Hindus tend to 
have the most favourable socio-economic status.  The relative disadvantage 
can be seen to have multiple causes, including the predominantly rural 
peasant background in the sending areas; historical migration patterns; 
employment opportunities; poor educational levels; harassment; and 
geographical concentration in areas of decline and deprivation (Beckford et al 
2006).   
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Unemployment rates are highest for Muslims (nearly 18% of those aged 16-
24 and nearly 14% of those aged over 25) and economic activity is low (50% 
of those 25+ compared to average of 67%).  Furthermore, there are factors 
that are particular to the Muslim community; for example, low representation 
of women in the workplace.  By way of comparison, the Sikh community has 
significantly higher levels of female engagement in formal labour market. 
Indeed, 29% of Muslim women aged 25+ are economically active (compared 
to 59% average).  Within the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities this is 
even lower (21% and 15% respectively).  This may be because of the 
traditional cultural values, together with early marriage and large family size – 
average household size (inclusive of all members) was 3.8 compared with 2.4 
for England as a whole.  Muslims have the highest actual and potential fertility 
rate.  
 
“Socio-economic indicators from the Census reveal a consistent 
picture of the vulnerable position of the aggregated Muslim 
population compared to people from other minority faith groups” 
(Beckford et al, 2006, p. 18). 
 
Muslims have the lowest proportion of men in white collar groups (based on 
Standard Occupational Classification, SOC): 42% compared on average with 
50%, plus average of 80% Jewish men and 63% Hindus.  There are a high 
percentage of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men who work in trades such as taxi 
driving and restaurants, with little career progression (ONS, 2004).  
Employment opportunities are directly linked to a number of factors including 
education.  In terms of educational attainment 41% of Muslims (aged 16-64) 
had no educational qualifications compared to less than 30% for all other 
groups.   
 
In terms of housing, members of Muslim communities tend to be concentrated 
in flats and terraced housing.  There are high levels of overcrowding, which 
are seen to have a knock-on effect on children’s life chances – 40% of 
Muslims live in overcrowded conditions compared to just over 10% for 
England as a whole.  In terms of housing deprivation, 40% of the Muslim 
population are affected by this compared to 15% for the population of England 
as a whole.  The highest rate occurs in Yorkshire & Humber (48%).     
 
In terms of regional variations in religious composition, the population of the 
North East is 1.1% Muslim. This is the lowest percentage in England with the 
exception of the South West (0.5%).  In terms of the highest proportions this is 
led by London (8.5%), West Midlands (4.1%), and Yorkshire & Humber 
(3.8%). 
 
The Muslim community has a youthful profile: the mean age across the 
community is around 26 years, compared to around 39 for all England: the 
Jewish and Christian groups have the oldest profile (43 and 41 respectively).   
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Members of Muslim communities tend to be concentrated in certain 
geographical areas, rather than residentially mixed, which may indicate the 
strong social networks within the communities.  A total of 33% of the Muslim 
population is located in the 10% most deprived areas.  There is a potential 
tension for policy and service delivery here as there is a need to focus on 
tackling social exclusion in these areas, but any efforts to do this can lead to 
perception that they are getting more favourable treatment, which has 
implications for community cohesion (as seen in Bradford, Oldham and 
Burnley (Home Office, 2001).  The Cantle report (Home Office, 2001) 
suggests the need for ethnically mixed housing and schools, the opening of 
Mosques to meetings of people of different faiths, improving facilities used by 
all rather than targeting at specific groups.  However, there is a question mark 
about the extent to which the conclusions of this report, based on the specific 
residential mix in specific North West towns are directly transferable to the 
situation in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
 
Experiences of Anti-Social behaviour and discrimination 
 
The need for protection from discrimination has been a key issue for Muslim 
communities for a number of years (Open Society Institute, 2005).  This is 
particularly acute post-September 11th 2001, where it is suggested that 
religion is more important than ethnicity in terms of who is most likely to 
experience racism and discrimination (Sheridan, 2002).  Discrimination is 
often focused on those who have visible markers of their religion (particularly 
in terms of dress) (Hopkins, 2004). 
 
Discrimination is often based on Islamophobia and stereotypes. (Open 
Society Institute, 2005).  ‘Islamophobia refers to prejudice or discrimination 
against Islam and, therefore, against Muslims.  The term came into more 
common use after the September 11th attacks but has been contested from 
both ‘sides’; being seen as inadequate to cover the full range of apathy or 
hostility towards Islam, while also being seen as a term that is used to 
undermine any criticism of Islam.’ The Runnymede Trust has identified eight 
components which they say defines Islamophobia.  This definition, from the 
1997 document 'Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All' is widely accepted, 
including by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.  
The eight components are: 
 
1. Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change. 
 
2. Islam is seen as separate and 'other'. It does not have values in 
common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not 
influence them. 
 
3. Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, 
primitive and sexist. 
 
4. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of 
terrorism and engaged in a 'clash of civilisations'. 
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5. Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military 
advantage. 
 
6. Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand. 
 
7. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices 
towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. 
 
8. Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal. 
 
To be a British Muslim is defined “solely in terms of negativity, deprivation, 
disadvantage and alienation” (Alexander, 2000, p. 6).   
 
There is also a perception that members of the Muslim population are 
increasingly discriminated against within the criminal justice system (Open 
Society Institute, 2005).  Policies such as ‘stop and search’ has exacerbated 
this and this has again increased as a result of the anti-terrorism legislation. 
Recently published figures show that, relative to the general population, Asian 
people were twice as likely to be stopped and searched as White people 
(Ministry of Justice 2008)      
 
There is some evidence that Muslim women experience a ‘triple bind’, being 
discriminated against due to gender, class and race.   
 
Muslim women 
 
With reference to Muslim women, it was found that women’s voices are 
seldom heard; therefore, Muslim women should be targeted when seeking the 
views of Muslim communities (Communities and Local Government, 2006).  
 
There is a need to ensure that resources are not just targeted at so called 
‘fluffy’ initiatives (i.e. sewing classes, henna design), but rather, women 
should be encouraged to become more involved in children’s schools and 
other areas intrinsic to community members’ lives.  The women who attended 
the PET event also expressed a desire to be more involved in the teaching at 
the mosques but there are barriers to this being possible.   
 
Attempts have been made, however, for more sustainable engagement with 
Muslim women; for example, the Muslim Women’s Group set up by the 
Minister for Women which acts as a channel of communication between 
Muslim women and Cabinet.  Furthermore, there is the Muslim Women’s 
Network (MWN), again linked to the Minister for Women.   
 
What needs to be considered is how to engage with those individuals who are 
not linked in as well, those without English language skills, or those whose 
cultural norms may, in some way, obstruct their engagement (Communities 
and Local Government, 2006).   
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With regards to young people, it is suggested that the ‘models’ their parents 
experienced do not always allow them to express themselves in ways 
appropriate to the societies with which they now identify (Fitzgerald, 2007).  
For example, many young people feel that mosque committees are not in 
touch with today’s issues of British Muslims (Communities and Local 
Government, 2006).  It is suggested that such committees are often a 
‘springboard’ to public life’ (Communities and Local Government, 2006).  
Some parents and Imams, however, may discourage young people from 
involvement at this level.  There is, therefore, a need for ‘political capacity 
building’ amongst young Muslims (Fitzgerald, 2007).  The women who 
attended the engaging with Muslim women event suggested the need for 
more out-of school activities for children (Communities and Local 
Government, 2006).  What appears to be the key issue is the need for a more 
inclusive approach towards young people.  It is suggested that if they are 
excluded they are, to some extent, more susceptible to extremist versions of 
Islam (Fitzgerald, 2007). 
 
The role of the Mosque 
 
A Mosque is a place of worship for the Muslim communities.  There are now 
over 1000 Mosques across the UK (MCB, 2006), which provide places of 
prayer, enlightenment, refuge and comfort for the Muslim communities 
(Masqood, 2005).  It has been highlighted that mosque facilities are one of the 
most valuable assets the Muslim communities possess (Maqsood, 2005).  
Their role is two-fold; firstly as a place of worship and secondly meeting 
educational and social needs (MCB, 2006).  
 
Historically the mosque had four major roles: a place of worship; a place of 
education; a judicial court; and a place for political and administrative decision 
making (Alavi, 1990).   
 
The role of the Imam in British mosques has changed over the years in 
response to the changing socio-economic needs of the Muslim communities 
(MCB, 2006).  Their role goes beyond leading daily prayer to being perceived 
as leaders, guides and scholars towards acting as informal reference points 
for a range of personal and social problems (MCB, 2006).  However, there 
have been calls in recent years for more training for Imams, as well as the 
need to train Imams from the UK rather than relying on those from overseas 
(Maqsood, 2005; MCB, 2006).       
 
It is also felt that there is a need to re-think the role of mosques to give them 
more of a community feel and make them less ‘cliquish’ and sectarian 
(Maqsood, 2005).  
 
“The role of Imams and the way mosques are run will undoubtedly 
be a significant factor in the future of multi-faith Britain.  However, 
if policy makers, communities and ultimately the wider society are 
to harness the positive aspects of this vast religious network of 
institutions, a much greater understanding needs to be arrived at 
in terms of both the role and nature of Imams and mosques and 
their position in British society” (MCB, 2006, p. 3).        
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Chapter 2: An Introduction to factors of Theo-Political 
influences for Muslims in Britain 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted earlier, the Muslim community in Britain is not homogenous. Its 
variance can be drawn upon lines of ethnicity, kinship, nationality, global and 
regional locality, sectarianism as well as socio-economic backgrounds. In 
Britain, immigrant settlement patterns may also influence interpretations of 
religious doctrine due to social/cultural dynamics within individual migrant 
communities where they live. According to the 2001 Census, Britain is home 
to approximately 1.6 million Muslims, however despite global events bringing 
them to the attention of the masses, very little is understood regarding the 
background of Islam and Muslims. The purpose of this chapter is to put into 
context the diverse backgrounds of Islamic influences on Muslim socio-
political dynamics.  
 
Background 
 
The majority of Muslims in Britain have origins in South Asia, which is 
reflected in the backgrounds of the schools of thought prevalent amongst 
British Muslims today. Post war Britain had seen the arrival of South Asians, 
but the communities that were formed had to create their own interpretations 
of identity in their journey to becoming ‘British Muslims’. This journey has 
been filled with numerous challenges for those that arrived in the 50’s, 60’s 
and later. The demise of the textile mills in the 70’s, unemployment and racist 
hostilities from the National Front, as well as the events in the following 
decades such as the Satanic Verses affair and their general opposition to the 
first Gulf War, placed them under scrutiny of their ‘British’ credentials 
particularly in the light of Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’ in 1991 on loyalty to 
the UK. In 2001, civil disturbances in the northern towns of England further 
demonstrated pointers to disenfranchisement of South Asian Muslims, but 
then September 11th of the same year ensured that 2nd and 3rd generation of 
Muslim immigrants would remain embroiled within the socio- political scene 
merely by proxy through being Muslims. It Is, therefore, essential to 
contextualise that the aim of this paper is not to analyse Islam, but to explain 
the background to pluralism amongst Muslims and to draw upon any drivers 
that could justify and motivate a radicalisation of Muslims. This chapter sets 
out a basic interpretation of how best to understand Muslim communities in 
terms of what Muslims regard as the various ‘schools of thought’ and ‘schools 
of law’ and will argue the existence of a separate entity of ‘movements’, which 
could influence Muslims.   
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The notion of Ummah 
 
Amongst much of the commentary on pluralism amongst Muslims, it is felt, 
that the notion of ‘Ummah’ is not given the prominence it deserves to provide 
the contextual basis of a basic premise for commonality amongst Muslims. 
Ummah gives Muslims an inter-connection, through a strong notion of 
brotherhood. This brotherhood theoretically transcends national, cultural and 
kinship boundaries, to provide a unifying identity as brothers and sisters in 
Islam. This notion of Ummah provides explanations for a whole host of 
interpretations of Muslim reasoning. For instance, in global terms Muslims 
would resonate with the Palestinian cause as a cause for the ‘whole Muslim 
Ummah’. This notion of Ummah has, therefore, been a very powerful tool to 
both unite Muslims but has also been used by extremists to galvanise 
Muslims who may be at risk of radicalism; giving justification to ‘fight against 
the west’, in order to directly respond against certain ‘causes’ such as 
Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir, which affect the Muslim Ummah in those 
lands. Ummah should not, however, be translated as a negative entity. It is an 
extremely powerful concept which gives Muslims a great deal of unity and 
puts emphasis on Muslims to act in a manner which promotes them in a 
positive light, not only amongst one another but also among non-Muslims. 
The notion of Muslim Ummah can also provide an understanding of why multi-
ethnic Muslims may interact with each other in positive manners such as has 
been observed in the Women study circles in Newcastle and also choose to 
live near each other because of shared Muslim Ummah identities and value 
systems as well as a requirement to have the same shared cultural and 
religious amenities in their vicinities.  
 
Islamic Traditions 
 
Islam has two main traditions – Shia and Sunni, and from them culminates 
what can be referred to as certain ‘schools of thought’ and ‘schools of law’. 
Sunni and Shia Muslims constitute between 80-85% and 15-20% of the 
worlds Muslim population, respectively. The two branches were borne out of 
the immediate fractions following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace 
be upon him). From there on Islam as a religion took its teachings and 
reference to societal and daily life, not only from the Quran and Caliphate 
rulers’ interpretations of jurisprudence in the light of the Quran, but also from 
culmination of the Hadith, which were interpretations of the Prophet’s life and 
were collated into volumes. Although Muslims from all divides agree with the 
Quran as an unquestionable and original text, its interpretations through the 
Hadith, forms part of the differences between the strands of Islam. Today, 
Shia Islam has a main following in Iran, although they are also found in Iraq, 
Pakistan, Syria, India, Afghanistan and Lebanon as sizeable minorities. 
 
Although there can be significant differences in the interpretations of the 
Quran and Hadith between Sunni’s and Shia’s, the two traditions still hold the 
same fundamental beliefs of Islam which is why they are both referred to as 
‘traditions’. What follows is a simplistic explanation to a complexity that has 
been extremely challenging to compile, partly because there is so much 
overlap between the various schools of thought. But its complexity is also due 
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to the fact that individuals will be individuals and although they may broadly 
hold the views of a particular school of thought, they may also ‘buy in’ to 
viewpoints from alternative schools of thought. 
 
Many scholars, academics and theologians would cite Islam as having up to 
73 sects. In order to simplify this complexity, we have tried to explain ‘Islamic 
Schools of Thought’ in a contextual manner by referring to the notion of 
Schools of Law as the fundamental basis to how Islamic pluralism can be 
understood. From this we have laid out the concept of ‘Contemporary Schools 
of Thought’ as a way in which to explain the basis of theological influencing 
practices over the last two centuries. Finally, the notion of ‘Islamic 
Movements’ as an influencing factor for some Muslims, is explained.    
 
For ease of explanation of a complex range of issues, there are four areas to 
consider. First, the ‘School of Law’, which is based on religious practice in 
terms of, for example, rituals for prayer as influenced by the 5 main Imams in 
Islam. Secondly, the ‘classical schools of thought’ which refers to the early 
teachings of each of these 5 Imams from the early 8th and 9th Centuries A.D. 
Thirdly, what we will call the ‘contemporary schools of thought’ based on how 
the classical schools have evolved over the past few centuries. Finally, 
Islamic movements that have arisen through various historic episodes will be 
reflected upon. 
 
Schools of Law 
 
In its first few centuries, Islam started to expand across and beyond the Arab 
peninsula and it became important to apply Islamic interpretations to religious 
practice, belief structure and interpretations of Islamic law. The interpretations 
of the practice of Islamic teachings were then influenced by 5 main scholars 
or Imams.  Four of these Imams were within the Sunni tradition and the fifth, 
Imam Jafar, was of the Shia tradition. The concept of ‘School of Law’ is drawn 
out of these Imams’ interpretations of practice of Islamic teachings.  The 
School of Law provides advice on interpretations of the Quran and Hadith on 
prayer and the conduct of lifestyle. Whereas followers of the four Sunni 
Imams can have overlap between each other, followers of Shia’ism abide 
primarily on advice handed by Imam Jafar.  
 
The Sunni tradition has been influenced by four Imams between the 8th and 
9th centuries A.D. These were, Imam Abu Hanifa (725 A.D) has the largest 
followers amongst Muslims and its school of law, Imam Maalik Ibn Anas (714 
A.D), Imam Shafi’ee (765 A.D) and Imam Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Hambal 
(855 A.D) 
 
Classical Schools of Thought 
 
Following the teachings of each respective Imam, directions have been 
embodied into Schools of Thought. These schools of thought have also been 
influenced by the cultures of the environments they have been adopted within 
and wherever each Imam has influenced greater, so that region has more 
followers of that school of thought. Hence, the Hanafi school is found 
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predominantly amongst South Asians, Iraq, Turkey, Northern and Central 
Asia. The Maaliki school amongst the African continent, Hamballi School 
amongst the Saudi and United Arab Emirates and Shafi’ee School amongst 
East Africans, Southern Arab peninsular and South East Asians. Finally Jafari  
school amongst Iranians, Shia Iraqis and Shia Pakistani.  
 
The origins of these schools of thought have been based primarily on 
teachings of the Imams. However, over time we have seen these traditional 
schools of thought being weaved through new interpretations which, at times, 
has seen the bringing together of multiple schools of thought.  Hence in 
relative terms we have ‘new’ interpretations of ‘traditional’ Islam influenced by 
not just early scholarly teachings of the early Imams but also through 
influences of regionalism, culture, ethnicity, family, kinship and even global 
politics.  
 
Contemporary Schools of Thought 
 
Before detailing how contemporary schools of thought have developed, an 
important additional factor to also reflect upon is the position of ‘Sufism’ within 
Islamic tradition. Both Sunn’ism and Shia’ism have to some degree 
acknowledged Sufism as either a separate tradition or an integral part of their 
tradition. Sufism is the practice of Islam through a spiritual and mystical 
component. It is organised through orders and led through spiritual guidance 
by a Pir, Sheikh, Walli (these can be classed by their followers as spiritual 
mystics, spiritual guiders or religious guiders). The propagation of Islam 
across the Indian Sub-continent has been said to be through the activities and 
influences of Pir’s and Sufi’s. Sufism has now, for some, become an 
independent school of thought but there is no doubt that its practices of Islam 
have impacted on contemporary schools of thought either by way of people 
rejecting elements of its practice or by way of adopting parts of its practice. 
 
Some of the contemporary schools of thoughts are as follows, although not 
exhaustive, are representative of a proportion of Newcastle’s Muslim 
communities; 
 
• Barelwi: The Barelwi school of thought has the largest following 
amongst Muslims in Britain and is made up primarily of Hanafi 
teachings and followers are therefore Sunni. They are also linked to 
having close ties with Sufiism. Traditionally the Barelwi order has been 
linked to rural areas of the Indian sub-continent, which is why they 
draw close relationship with Sufi traditions as early Pirs had legacies in 
rural areas.  There are, however different ‘types’ of Barelwis. However, 
their critics from other schools associate them with practices they call 
‘un-Islamic’, such as considering ‘Pirs’ as intermediaries to God in 
prayer practices. However, in reality Barelwis may differ from person to 
person and as collectives from village to village. 
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• Naqshbandi: The Naqshbandi order is becoming more prominent in 
Britain and is derived through the Sufi tradition, although some 
commentators would argue they are an ‘extreme version’ of Barelwis. 
This is just one of a variety of orders derived from Sufi tradition and is 
considered to be the largest and most influential of all Sufi orders. Its 
founder Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari promoted spiritual and moral 
enlightenment through manners of religious meditation in the 14th 
century, which form the basis of this form of Sufism and is still 
continued through Sheikhs who are revered by their followers. 
 
• Deobandi: The city of Deoband in India, is where the Deoband school 
started in 1867. Generally Deobandi’s viewed the influence of Hindu 
culture in Indian sub-continent as a threat to ‘pure’ Islamic teachings. 
Their traditional background is, as with Barelwi, also Hanafi Sunni, but 
they are generally at odds with Barelwi’s for the reasons cited above, 
i.e., Sufi traditional influences on Barelwiism, which they consider to be 
‘un-Islamic’.   They have a conservative view of Islam especially in their 
appearance through strict interpretation. Their heritage as a school of 
thought has been linked to the19th century colonial India, where they 
felt Islam was under threat, so they outwardly took physical traits of 
identifying themselves as Muslims through their style of dress and as a 
defence mechanism. Deobandi’s define religion as a personal matter, 
separate to the domains of politics and government and believe they 
can live as a minority in non-Islamic countries if there is tolerance 
towards them. They are generally opposed to the Barelwi stance of 
Sufi influence as a deviation from true Islamic teachings. Some 
Deobandi’s may be sympathetic to the Salafi school of thought, which 
is quite a strict adherence to an ‘Islamic way of life’, but on the whole it 
would be incorrect to consider Deobandi’s as purely Salafi. 
 
• Salafi: A major factor of Salafi view is its opposition to Sufi influence to 
interpretation of Islam. Salafi’s have a very strict and conservative 
interpretation of the Quran and interpretation of Islam. Salafi believe 
that their interpretation of Islam is in accordance with original text and 
practice from the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). 
The rise of Salafi’s came about primarily in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, through a notion of a sense of decline in Islam, but 
they are also referred to as Wahabbis who have origins in the process 
of the formation of the state of Saudi Arabia earlier in the seventeenth 
century. The state of Saudi Arabia has since the 1970’s been 
‘exporting’ Wahabbism across the globe and has made a concerted 
effort to spread Wahabbi/ Salafi thought as a pure doctrine to follow. 
Some Wahabbi groups have such a strong view of their way of 
interpreting Islam that they consider followers of other schools of 
thought as sometimes causing heresy and ‘un-Islamic’. 
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Islamic Movements 
 
Many of the movements mentioned below are followers of Salafi/Wahabbi 
schools of thought. This is understandable when central to the roots to this 
school of thought is the strict positioning of Islam based on a personal and 
societal requirement to adhere to their interpretation of Islam. Many of them 
were borne out of a political backdrop of revivalist movements against 
colonialism. In terms of these movements, these have generally been 
considered to be ‘reformist Salafis’ who believe in personal and social 
transformation through education and propagation and ‘Jihadist Salafi’s’ who 
believe in the necessity of violence to achieve social and religious goals. This 
is by no means an exhaustive list and is to exemplify the motivating factors in 
contemporary theo-politics amongst Muslims.  It is to provide background to 
information on theo-politics amongst Muslims, and is not expected to be a 
description of the position of Newcastle’s Muslim Communities. 
 
Wahabbism: Although Wahabbism was described earlier as a contemporary 
school of thought it is heavily inspirational in various movements. Its origins 
are found within the positioning of the tribe of Saud in Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia is the state which holds two of the most sacred sites in Islam, the 
Kaaba in the city of Makka, and the burial site for the Prophet Muhammed 
(Peace be upon him) in the city of Medina so, therefore, it has religious 
importance for Muslims. In the seventeenth century the leaders of the Saud 
tribe aligned themselves with the teachings of al-Wahab in order to lay claim 
to the leadership of the state. This was based on a strict alliance of doctrine, 
with its extreme form viewing Muslims that do not conform to their teachings 
as being non-Muslims and their viewpoints to therefore be challenged. 
The Saudis began promoting Wahabbism through funds generated by oil 
wealth and through the establishments of Saudi institutions such as the 
Islamic University in Medina. During the 1980’s, Saudi Arabia, along with the 
US and Britain helped the Afghani ‘Mujahideen’ movement against the Soviet 
invasion. Wahabbism was therefore becoming part of the Afghani military 
resistance. However, in the 1990’s once promoting Wahabism across the 
globe, the Saudi state alienated a number of Wahabi inspired groups by 
supporting US forces in the Gulf War and allowing non-Muslim forces into the 
lands of Islamic heritage. This has thought to be a catalyst for developing an 
international revolutionary Wahabbism, which can even be opposed to the 
Saudi state – an example would be Al-Qaida.  Despite Wahbbism being 
propagated through the Saudi’s, due to the positioning of Saudi policy, 
Wahabbis across the globe are largely in two camps, pro-Saudi and anti-
Saudi.  
 
The issues highlighted as grievances that some of these internationalist 
revolutionary Wahabbi groups have capitalised upon are the Palestinian 
cause, Chechnya, the Balkan conflict and Bosnian Muslim genocide, the 
Satanic Verses and the perceived demonisation of Islam and Islamic ideals.  
These issues have been capitalised by certain groups.   
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Tabligh-i-Jamaat : This was founded in 1920 in colonial India by Muhammad 
Ilyas who was a Deobani and believed in a grass root revival of Islam through 
which Muslims would generate an awareness of its principles amongst each 
other. It undertakes missionary within the Muslim community, through 
volunteers, by promoting brotherhood amongst Muslims and inviting Muslims 
to attend its gatherings. Tabligh-i-Jamaat, although having a strong Deobandi 
heritage, is today considered by some to be a Wahabbi/Salafi movement.   
 
Jamaati Islami:  This is a revivalist movement started by Maulana Mawdudi 
originally in colonial India and then applied his writings and works in Pakistan. 
He believed in the strict adherence to Shariah as opposed to what were 
deemed as local customs. He believed that there should be no separation 
between state and religion. He believed in an ‘amir’ to rule the state with a 
council of advisors and referred to the system as a ‘theo-democracy’. 
Mawdudi was critical of conservative ‘ulemas’ or religious scholars and 
believed Muslims should be empowered as individuals to make their own 
determinations by their own understanding of the Quran.  He was, however, 
conservative regarding dress codes and believed Muslim women should 
cover their faces when in public. Jamaat-Ilslami activity today restricts itself to 
preaching Islam within and amongst Muslims in their communities.   
 
Hizb –ut Tahrir (HT): This is the most controversial Islamic political 
movement in Britain at present. Although it has had offshoot 
organisations/movements arising from it abroad, in Britain it has largely 
remained known as HT. This is a movement that has been inspired in 1953 by 
its Palestinian founder, An-Nabhani, whose central message was that the 
reason for the demise of Muslim countries was because of the abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924. He believed the reconstitution of a ‘Khalifa’ state was the 
only way to bring about Muslim glory and its development was a Muslim 
obligation. He went on to state the requirement of ‘liberating’ non-Muslim state 
through offensive jihad. HT in Britain claim to be non-violent, but reject all 
forms of secular ideology in secular society including democracy, which is 
considered an ‘infidel’ system and refuse to participate in political systems in 
Britain. However, this could be changing as in some parts of the country HT 
members have been known to become involved in public debates. Calls from 
Tony Blair, as Prime Minister, to ban HT resonated with a profile of it as a 
dangerous and extremist organisation and movement. Although as an 
organisation it is banned in many countries across the globe including in some 
Muslim countries, this is not the case in Britain. It is understood to be popular 
amongst the student populous across Britain. However, there is no evidence 
of it being active at University campuses in Newcastle. The debate for 
banning or not banning HT continues.  It is essential to help facilitate and 
create civic and political engagement for young Muslim people who may air 
and reason grievances without having to turn to such an organisation which, 
for some period of its history, refused to participate or engage in political 
dialogue.    
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Tackling Radicalism  
 
The Government’s recent ‘Prevent’ Strategy draws upon inequalities in 
society and community cohesion to be important factors for counteracting the 
threat of terrorism. It highlights an importance of understanding communities 
and the dynamics of communities. It is, therefore, important to note that 
although the pluralism which exists amongst Muslims is a complex weave of 
religious doctrine as well as influences of cultures and kinship, Muslims must 
be viewed and understood in manners that reflect their diversity. This 
complexity may be difficult to disentangle but it is important not to demonise 
any element of its followers from whichever strand of Islamic discourse, as 
this will alienate them from dialogue. Therefore, just because followers of 
Salafi school of thought may be deemed as conservative, from this it must not 
be viewed that they are beyond consultation or communication and be prone 
to radicalism.  What motivates individuals to potentially turn to radicalism can 
be a whole host of factors, including a general alienation from society. In 
accordance with the ‘Prevent’ strategy, a better understanding of Muslims 
amongst non-Muslims is essential to promote community cohesion. Building 
resilience within Muslim Communities is essential, some work of which is 
already being undertaken in Newcastle, such as DEEN, Islamic Centre for 
Diversity and the study circles, however, more can be done such as 
mentoring programmes for young Muslims. In Objective 5 of the ‘Prevent’ 
Strategy document, the emphasis is placed upon addressing grievances, 
which can be achieved through building confidence within Muslim 
communities to convey their grievances. This can only be achieved by 
ensuring firstly that organisations are made aware of Islamic communities and 
Muslims, followed by work done to build confidence among Muslims. 
 
Radicalism can ultimately only be addressed if the causes for radicalism and 
alienation of Muslims are tackled. This can partly be achieved by tackling 
institutional and societal inequalities but many would also argue, Muslim and 
non-Muslim alike, that through Britain’s position on foreign policy radicalism 
could be addressed, which is why the message of Al-Qaida does resonate for 
the few who turn to a perverse form of theo-politics to justify their acts of 
extremism.  
 
Mosques in Newcastle 
 
Most mosques in Britain still associate themselves with the main generic 
strands of traditions, i.e., they consider themselves as ‘Sunni’ or ‘Shia’. Only a 
very few of them identify themselves as being part of a contemporary school 
of thought, i.e, Barelwi or Deobandi and this can be due to a variety of 
reasons, such as congregations attending may do so for just prayer purposes 
and not for religious guidance or they may not have a ‘communal linkage’ with 
a particular mosque (through, for instance, relatives). The complexity of 
identifying a mosque by its school of thought can be even more confusing 
when two different contemporary schools of thought mosques, such as a 
Barelwi mosque and a Deoband mosque, may both identify themselves as 
‘Sunni mosques’. In chapter 5 the mosques in Newcastle and comments on 
issues around engagement with them is discussed. However, how they 
considered to identify themselves and their congregations is as follows:
 21 
 
*These mosques are communal and although adhere to the generic Sunni traditions, do not 
align themselves to any particular positioning and are visited by Muslims from a variety of 
ethnic backgrounds primarily as a place of worship.    
 
It should also be noted that new mosques could convene at any point in local 
settings for a variety of reasons. These could be in newly identified communal 
spaces and settings or even in peoples homes so, therefore, the 
aforementioned list may not be an absolute list of mosques in Newcastle.  
Mosque 
Name 
Address Tradition Congregation Main Ethnic 
Groups 
Shajhalal  
Mosque 
26-28 Sceptre 
Street 
Sunni Deobandi, 
Barelwi 
Bangladeshi 
Newcastle 
Central 
Masjid 
Grainger Park 
Road 
Sunni Neutral* Multi Ethnic 
Shi'a 
Mosque 
52a Wingrove 
Road 
Shia Shia Iranian, Iraqi 
& Pakistani 
 
Madina 
Masjid 
Mosque 
4-36 Wingrove 
Gardens 
Sunni Barelwi & 
Jamaat Islami 
Pakistani 
Malvern 
Street 
Mosque 
4 Malvern 
Street 
Sunni Barelwi,  Pakistani 
Iranian 
Mosque 
Bentinck Road Shia Shia Iranian 
Turkish 
Mosque 
35 Grainger 
Park Road 
Sufi Sufi  Turkish 
Al Raza 
Mosque 
98 Stanton 
Street 
Barelwi 
Naqshbandi 
Barelwi 
Naqshbandi 
Sufi 
Pakistani 
Newcastle 
University 
Mosque 
King George V 
Building,  
 
Sunni Neutral* Multi-Ethnic 
 
Northumbria 
University 
Mosque 
Prayer Room,   
Ground Floor, 
Northumberland 
Building 
Sunni Neutral* Multi-Ethnic 
 
Heaton 
Mosque 
1 Rothbury 
Terrace, 
Heaton 
Sunni Barelwi,  Pakistani 
Bangladesh 
Community 
Centre & 
Mosque 
246 Elswick 
Road 
Sunni Deobandi, 
Barelwi 
Bangladeshi 
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Chapter 3: Effective engagement with Muslim 
communities: a literature and good practice 
review 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to present a review of the national, regional and local 
practice (both good and bad) in the engagement of Muslim communities. An 
overview of engagement is then presented in order to examine what 
community engagement is, the importance of engaging with communities and 
some broad principles to ensure engagement is effective. Specific examples 
of engagement with Muslims, as well as other communities, are reviewed as 
well as issues which need to be considered when engaging with communities 
and their members. The lessons which can be learned in order to provide a 
strategic and evidence based way forward are also highlighted. 
 
What is ‘community engagement’? 
 
Community engagement is used to describe a wide range of activities that 
assists the communication process between various stakeholders and local 
community members. It has been said that there are a number of different 
levels of community engagement, these may include: information-giving, 
consultation, involvement, empowerment and capacity building: 
 
- Information-giving - This is the simplest form of engagement and refers 
to the provision of information to a particular community. 
 
- Consultation - Where the views and opinions of community members 
are actively sought in order to inform the decision-making process. 
 
- Involvement - Where community members are actively involved in the 
decision making process and are supported to work proactively with 
other key stakeholders 
 
- Empowerment and capacity building - This is an intensive level of 
community engagement where other stakeholders take an enabling 
role to support community members in developing and implementing 
their own decisions and plans. 
 
It is not suggested that any single one of these levels is ‘better’ in some way 
than another, rather any engagement needs to be situated within the 
appropriate context, purpose and issue in hand. 
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Why is community engagement important? 
 
The practice of community engagement is used to enable effective 
communication and involvement between community members and other key 
stakeholders. Engaging with members of communities helps to enable all 
stakeholders to develop a vision for communities in partnership with existing 
community members to create a shared vision for how communities should 
live together and an understanding as to how communities currently live. 
When people are involved in the planning, design and development of their 
community and issues which directly affect their community, it engenders a 
greater sense of community spirit, belonging and ownership. This in turn 
raises expectations, encourages commitment to an area and helps in creating 
‘sustainable communities’ (Communities and Local Government, 2007). 
 
Ensuring effective engagement  
 
Effective engagement is not an easy target to achieve for a number of 
reasons, including: apathy, lack of understanding or capacity available on 
behalf of local community members. Equally stakeholders need to be 
committed to the dynamic and challenging process community engagement 
often entails. Therefore, in order to help ensure that attempts at fostering 
community engagement are successful it is important to take a systematic 
approach. As such it is important to consider: 
 
• Who the community is; 
 
• Who you will consult/engage with; 
 
• Appropriate methods for engaging with communities and sections 
thereof; 
 
• How you are going to support the development of skills and capacity 
building within communities; 
 
• Who is responsible for implementation; 
 
• Available resources; 
 
• What you are going to do with the information obtained; and 
 
• How you will provide feedback to the community. 
 
In order to ensure that any performance of community engagement is 
successful it is vital it is monitored and evaluated.  
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The engagement of Muslim communities 
 
The policy backdrop 
 
Recently, there has been a growing amount of work around engaging with 
members of Muslim communities.     
 
As mentioned previously, the London bombings on July 7th highlighted the 
importance of community engagement and, indeed, the lack of it.  In the 
aftermath of this attack on London, the Home Office launched Preventing 
Extremism Together (PET) to work with the Muslim community with the aim of 
combating extremism and its causes.  Indeed, it has been argued that 
community engagement needs to be put at the heart of counter-terrorism 
(DEMOS, 2006). 
 
The Government’s current strategy, created in 2003, is known as CONTEST.  
It is based on four Ps (see Home Office, 2006): 
 
• Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals; 
 
• Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them; 
 
• Protecting the public, key national services and UK interests overseas; 
and 
 
• Preparing for the consequences. 
 
It is suggested, however, that prior to the July 7th bombings, the Prevention 
strand of this approach did not get adequate attention or resources (DEMOS, 
2006).   
 
Preventing Extremism Together (PET) established 7 working groups to 
consider the following issues (Communities and Local Government, 2005): 
 
• Engaging with young people; 
 
• Education (providing education that meets the needs of the Muslim 
community); 
 
• Engaging with Muslim women 
 
• Supporting regional and local initiatives and community action; 
 
• Imam training and accreditation and the role of mosques; 
 
• Community security (including addressing Islamophobia, protecting 
Muslims from extremism and increasing confidence in Police); and 
 
• Tackling extremism and radicalisation.  
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One thousand British Muslims took part in the consultations and a timetable of 
six weeks was given for the groups to discuss and reach their 
recommendations.  These groups went on to produce 64 recommendations; 
27 were for government to take forward while the remainder were for the 
communities themselves (Communities and Local Government, undated).  
Three of the main recommendations for communities to take forward (with 
Government support) involve three different initiatives.  The first is the 
Scholars’ Roadshows, which have been taking place across the UK and 
involve influential ‘mainstream’ scholars speaking to young Muslims to give 
‘effective arguments against extremist justification for terrorism’ (Communities 
and Local Government, undated).  This includes the setting up of a website 
where people can access transcripts from the Roadshows and vote on where 
future events should be held (Radical Middle Way, undated).  Indeed, the 
Internet is seen as an important way of connecting people and promoting 
positive images, particularly for young people (FitzGerald, 2007).     
 
The second initiative involves setting up six regional forums (known as Muslim 
Forums against Extremism and Islamophobia), which bring together 
communities and local agencies and offer a ‘safe space for sharing views’ 
(Communities and Local Government, undated).  The third initiative was the 
creation of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which 
was to be lead by Muslim communities to look at accreditation of Imams and 
better governance of mosques.   
 
There are of course criticisms of the Government’s approach, particularly in 
terms of the perception that Government is ‘appeasing’ extremists (DEMOS, 
2006).  One commentator also raises questions about the members of 
MINABs steering committee, particularly with regards to groups with alleged 
links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas (Goodman, 2007).  They argue 
that ultimately there is a need for a national advisory body: 
 
“but it would be fatal to the struggle against extremism were the 
allies of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to regulate and 
ultimately control - under the politically acceptable jargon of best 
practice and quality standards - Britain's Islamic religious 
institutions”.    
 
The experience of engagement with Muslim communities  
 
Putting the recommendations and the criticisms of those aside, it is necessary 
to consider the actual approaches taken for engaging with Muslim 
communities in the aftermath of the bombings, experience of these, and look 
at the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches.   
 
Consultation with some of those who attended the various workshops that 
were held as part of PET highlighted that there was a feeling that it was a 
waste of time and Government would ultimately just pick the particular issues 
that concerned the Government’s agenda (DEMOS, 2006).  Criticisms were 
directed at the way this engagement process was seen to be rushed 
(DEMOS, 2006).  Indeed, if the aim is to foster sustainable dialogue between 
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communities, a six week consultation period perhaps does not do justice to 
the importance of the issues under discussion.  There were also concerns 
expressed about consulting with ‘the usual suspects’, thus every time 
Government seeks to consult with the Muslim communities they are drawing 
on the views of the same people.  Indeed, it has been argued that: 
 
“Ministers (and some opposition spokespersons) publicly demand 
too much from Muslim community leaders who are not 
representative enough to deliver in any case” (Democratic Audit, 
2006, p.11).      
 
There were even criticisms levelled at the timing of the engagement meetings, 
particularly when some people were sent invitations to attend meetings during 
Eid, thus showing a lack of cultural understanding on the part of those who 
were organising the consultation process (DEMOS, 2006). 
 
One of the biggest criticisms that emerged was that it was felt that certain 
subjects were ‘out of bounds’ in terms of the discussions. There are those, for 
example, who are deeply unhappy about foreign policy (particularly with 
regards to Iraq).  Commentators also highlight that Muslim communities suffer 
deprivation, discrimination and social exclusion.  One report in particular 
highlights that Muslim communities suffer three types of exclusion: exclusion 
through violence; economic exclusion; and political and public exclusion 
(Open Society Institute, 2005).  Unfortunately, such ‘grievances’ were not 
open for discussion, which in some respects was seen to hinder the 
community engagement process (Open Society Institute, 2005).   
 
According to DEMOS (2006) there are a number of good reasons for making 
community engagement central to counter-terrorism.  For example, 
communities are vital sources of information and intelligence, acting in many 
respects as an ‘early warning system’.  Consultation with community 
members who took part in the working groups highlighted that some members 
had seen signs of radicalisation emerging during the 1990s linked to activity in 
Bosnia.  During this time, it is suggested that London became one of the most 
important hubs for Al Qaida activity (DEMOS, 2006).  What is interesting is 
that the focus on community engagement can sometimes be met with 
resentment as the focus seems to be limited to tackling terrorism.  
Engagement has, therefore, emerged as the result of a ‘crisis’ rather than a 
matter of course and, as a result, questions arose over the possible 
sustainability of any outcomes:  “A sudden rush to engage groups primarily on 
issues of security in response to an immediate crisis could only expect to 
have limited success” (FitzGerald, 2007, p.13).     
 
It has emerged that community members have clearly been seeing the signs 
of problems to come, but as little or no engagement has taken place; there 
have been no ‘structures’ in place for the sharing of such information. It is 
suggested that:  
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“The more authorities can win hearts and minds within the Muslim 
communities, the more likely they are to gain the vital intelligence 
that can save lives” (Democratic Audit, 2006, p.11). 
     
DEMOS (2006) claim that is has become clear that communities are ideally 
placed and can act on these warnings to divert young and/or susceptible 
people from extremism.  Thus acting as a ‘self policing’ mechanism.  
 
DEMOS (2006) suggest that a community-based approach towards counter-
terrorism should be underpinned by four basic principles, these are expanded 
upon below: 
 
1. it must be locally based, as well as recognising and responding to 
differences within the Muslim community; 
 
2. There needs to be an understanding of faith; 
 
3. The policy-making process must be transparent and accountable; and  
 
4. Government needs to ‘recognise and respond to grievances of Muslim 
communities’. 
 
In the first instance, local community groups, for example, can be very 
effective in helping groups overcome economic and social disadvantage.  It is 
felt that these should be encouraged and strengthened, particularly those who 
show good practice.  However, any work at a local level needs to be 
underpinned by a national strategy (DEMOS, 2006).  
 
Secondly, research highlights the need to work with more faith-based 
organisations.  The Salafi community in particular is highlighted as one of the 
groups to work with, as this is one that ‘creates most unease’ (DEMOS, 
2006).  The basis of these arguments is that community engagement is not 
just about working with mainstream groups, but also those with more radical 
ideas, whilst recognising the need to be able to distinguish between radicals 
and violent extremists (DEMOS, 2006).   
 
Community Cohesion Pathfinder Programme  
 
Launched in 2003, the Community Cohesion Pathfinder Programme places 
the creation of common ground between communities at the heart of 
community cohesion (Home Office, 2003).  Recognising the importance of 
faith when looking at communities, and related values, is seen as a real 
resource in implementing of community cohesion strategies.  Faith-based 
organisations are often the main points of access to some communities.   
 
The Middlesbrough Pathfinder are working with local faith communities 
around initiatives such as the development of an inter-faith council, but also 
ensuring that women and young people are involved.  It has been claimed 
that this has not been an easy process and involves working through inter-
faith issues (Community Cohesion Pathfinder Programme, undated).  
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Similarly, Southwark Pathfinder has been working with Southwark Community 
Empowerment Network and the Multi Faith Forum on engaging with faith 
communities.  They have planned a programme of cross-faith events. 
   
 
The importance of faith is also highlighted in a recent consultation by 
Communities and Local Government (2007), which looks at the need for inter-
faith dialogue and the commitment to developing a new ‘inter faith strategy’.     
 
Thirdly, it is clear that in order for any policy to be transparent and credible the 
process needs to be clear and accountable. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 
According to Fitzgerald (2007) another example of good practice comes from 
the US.  The FBI has taken steps to open up their engagement process by 
regularly opening itself up to questioning in public meetings.  This highlights 
that engagement is a two-way process, involving some element of sharing of 
information as well as building up the trust of those with whom you wish to 
engage. 
 
 
Fourthly, as has been mentioned previously, it is felt that Government needs 
to recognise and respond to issues such as poverty social exclusion, 
educational/employment under-achievement, as well as foreign policy.  The 
argument is clearly for the need to open up the debate to topics that may 
make Government uncomfortable, but only by doing this will they fully gain the 
trust of communities.  There is the need to foster a climate where debate is 
encouraged, rather than the perception that when members of the Muslim 
communities express opinions they are going to become involved in violence 
and extremism (Fitzgerald, 2007), “An increasing political assertiveness by 
British Muslims should not be mistaken for a desire for separateness”.  It is 
highlighted that what needs to be considered with regards to terrorism is the 
fact that international networks ‘feed’ off local everyday grievances and 
terrorism is about exploit rifts for revolutionary purposes (Fitzgerald, 2007).  
 
Cross cultural round table - Canada 
 
Good practice examples can be drawn from Canada, which has developed a 
model of public engagement (see Innovative Research Group, 2004).  In 
particular they have a ‘cross cultural round table’, which includes different 
groups of people being brought together to talk about common issues, rather 
than separate groups all working separately.  These round table discussions 
have also become an important source of intelligence (Fitzgerald, 2007).   
 
 30 
Women and young people often do not have a very pro-active role in their 
local mosque, yet mosques can be an important and influential community 
resource.  One report highlights that the Bradford Council of Mosques, for 
example, has introduced notions of citizenship into the teaching at the 
mosque schools, with the aim of showing that Islamic values are consistent 
with core British values (Communities and Local Government, 2005).  Part of 
this teaching is aimed at showing that Islam does not permit the harming or 
terrorisation of UK citizens as well as learning ways to identify and avoid 
those who preach such views (Islam Online, 2007).  There have been some 
criticisms levelled at some of the content of the teaching; for instance, there 
were proposals that in one example the students were to be asked what they 
would do if a friend bought a large quantity of fertilizer and announced that 
they planned to build a bomb out of it.  It is argued that extremism can occur 
in all communities and the British National Party is highlighted as an example 
of this. Therefore, "The issue of terror and extremism needs to be addressed 
across the board rather than saying: 'Here, Muslims, go into your corner and 
have your curriculum'" (Islam Online, 2007). 
 
Recent research from the MCB (2006) highlights that not enough Imams are 
being developed from within Britain and the existing training is inadequate or 
has serious shortcomings.  As this report highlights, the role of Imams goes 
beyond leading daily prayer to being perceived as leaders, guides and 
scholars, acting as informal reference points for a range of personal and 
social problems.  Those who took part in the MCB research felt that any 
accreditation needed to be carried out by a Muslim organisation, independent 
of Government control and influence.  The report highlights need for cultural 
awareness, need to combat negative media and need for more involvement of 
women, etc.  They also highlight the need for a community engagement 
strategy for the MCB and seminar programmes for British Muslims.   
 
What emerges from the literature is that there appears to be contradictory 
ideas from Government who, on the one hand want partnership working but 
on the other hand expect people to put up with certain situations for the sake 
of ‘national security’.  It has been argued, however, that “the things we do in 
the name of ‘security’ alienate the very people we need to engage” (DEMOS, 
2006).  Examples can be found in the approach of some counter-terrorist 
interventions, such as the Forest Gate raid, which led to the arrest of two 
brothers and the shooting of one of them.  The brothers were later released, 
without charge, but such interventions are clearly damaging to community 
relations.  These measures affect the ability to gain the trust of the very 
communities whose cooperation is vital.  It is felt that the Police and Security 
Service cannot act without consent of those they are there to protect and 
need to secure active consent if they are to carry on intervening in ways that 
are affecting people’s lives.  Simply put, people should not have to just ‘put up 
and shut up’ (DEMOS, 2006).   
 
Although the actions of the police have come under scrutiny, there are 
examples of good practice by the police with regards to community 
engagement which can be drawn upon.   
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‘Operation Overt’ 
 
‘Operation Overt’ in High Wycombe was borne out of the alleged plot to blow up 
Heathrow airport.  Muslim groups in this area had concerns over how the raids 
were being handled.  The concern for the police team was to communicate with 
and reassure the Muslim community in High Wycombe.  They developed a 
number of aims, in particular the need to understand and effectively police the 
needs of the Muslim community; to ensure multi-agency coordination; and the 
need to understand and manage the needs of immediate and extended family of 
those involved in on-going investigations. 
 
The objective was to establish clear lines of communication and strengthen 
relationships between the police and the Muslim communities.  The approach 
taken in High Wycombe was to appoint a Muslim Community and Diversity Officer, 
who offered support for families displaced by police searches.  The community 
assisted in identifying points of contact who could act as information points and the 
police were keen to ensure that the community were always given up-to-date 
information.   The methods of engagement included public meetings, meetings 
with Muslim women, meetings at youth forums, as well as a sporting event for the 
police and the public.   
 
There have been a number of positive outcomes of this operation.   In particular, 
youth engagement through sport is an area they have been keen to continue 
developing and the Muslim Youth Forum is now active in High Wycombe, with a 
long term aim to include young people from the non-Muslim community as well.  It 
was also the first time the Muslim community acknowledged extremist elements 
and engaged with police and other agencies to address this issue.  The operation 
has led to the creation of a network of contacts that can help communication.  A 
cohesion plan has also been developed by the Muslim community, which focuses 
on engagement through initiatives such as meetings in mosques and 
Understanding Islam courses. - See Thornton and Mason (2007). 
 
Metropolitan Police Service - Cultural and Communities Resource Unit 
(CCRU) 
 
The Cultural and Communities Resource Unit (CCRU) runs a confidential 
database of officers who volunteer expertise in particular areas.  This means that 
the police can match up ‘life skills’ as well as professional skills, for example, 
matching up an Arabic speaking officer to work with the Algerian community.   
 
Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) 
 
MPS also have the Muslim Contact Unit, which aims to provide communication 
channels to reassure and impart advice; work in partnership with these 
communities to develop strategies to counter extremism and radicalisation; and 
provide advice to the MPS as a whole on security issues affecting Muslims in 
London1. 
 
                                                 
1
 See Metropolitan Police Authority: 
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2006/060727/08b.htm 
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One of the key issues highlighted is the need for the police to develop 
relationships with Muslim communities that are not related to security or 
terrorism (DEMOS, 2006).   
 
Ultimately what needs to be recognised is that this is relatively new ground 
where little work has been done, however, it is possible that knowledge and 
practice can be drawn from engagement that has occurred with other 
communities.  Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2003) for 
example, gathered the views of Christians, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs with 
regards to involvement in urban regeneration.  Although the focus is slightly 
different to the debates raised in this review, they highlight a list of 
considerations for engagement with communities, which can just as easily 
apply to the current context:   
 
• Communities know what is best for them; 
 
• There is a need to listen to the voices of the people; 
 
• To achieve outcomes, initiatives have to come from local communities; 
and 
 
• Need to work through the people who are actually relating to people so 
that trust and confidence can grow. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has drawn on a number of sources to look at the issue of 
community engagement and why it is important, as well as providing 
examples of community engagement in practice, drawing on examples of 
efforts that have been made to engage with Muslim communities as well as 
examples of good practice from engaging with other communities.  What has 
emerged from this review is that caution is needed in any future efforts to 
engage with Muslim communities.  A number of working 
conclusions/recommendations based on this initial review of the literature 
available can be identified:  
 
• There is a need to ensure that engagement is not replicated.  
Replication/duplication can be perceived as a waste and may give the 
perception that engagement is merely tokenistic.  Authorities, therefore, 
need to find out what forms of engagement are already taking place 
and see how the capacity of these can be built;   
 
• It is clear that for engagement to be successful time needs to be taken;  
 
• Engagement should be seen as an organic process that needs to be 
boundless i.e. although an authority might have an agenda this should 
be flexible enough for community members to bring their grievance and 
concerns; 
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• Engagement needs to take place at a range of different levels and 
sections of communities, including engaging with more difficult 
(possibly radical) groups.  This is not an easy task and, as highlighted 
in this review, some commentators raise questions about the 
involvement of certain groups.  At the same time we have to be careful 
of focusing on ‘mainstream’ groups as it implies selectivity about who 
we engage with (see Fitzgerald, 2007).  One of the key issues is 
avoiding engaging with the ‘usual suspects’, as well as ensuring that 
the management committees within Muslim organisations, like other 
communities, reflect the characteristics of the people who use the 
service (DEMOS, 2006); 
 
• There is the need for a reciprocal approach to cultural sensitivity and 
recognition of cultural differences; for example, needs to be gender and 
culturally sensitive;   
 
• Community engagement inevitably draws upon wider issues (national 
and international).  There appears to be a need for room for such 
issues to be aired in order for engagement to move forward;  
  
• Engagement should not simply just take place as a reaction to a crisis 
situation.  In a multi-layered and multi-cultural society efforts to engage 
with different communities should be a matter of course.  The impetus 
for engagement with Muslim communities has been the threat of 
terrorism.  Clearly, from a counter-terrorism perspective, community 
engagement is becoming increasingly important, however, this should 
not be seen as the sole reason to engage with Muslim communities; 
and 
 
• There is a need for engaging Muslims in areas not defined by faith.  
This may mean linking Muslim groups with other groups sharing 
common interests.  This brings people together for common goals 
rather than singling certain groups out.                   
 
In conclusion it needs to be emphasised that although it is acknowledged that 
there is a certain degree of exclusion within our communities, recent research 
from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2006) found that with some young 
British-Pakistani men in Bradford, “far from feeling disempowered, 
disengaged, excluded or otherwise victimised, the men were connected to 
their city, faith and heritage”.  Care should be taken to ensure that 
generalisations about a ‘community’ based on faith, ethnicity or any other 
homogenising factor does not unwittingly create exclusion where none 
previously existed. It has also been suggested that the community is ‘closing 
in on itself’ and is ‘bruised’ from poor attempts to engage combined with a 
lack of consistency from Government (DEMOS, 2006).  However, this review 
has highlighted a number of areas of good practice that others can draw upon 
with regards to community engagement and from whom lessons can be 
learned.   
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Section 4: The Muslim community in Newcastle 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This fourth section provides an overview of the Muslim community in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne drawing on existing secondary information.  As part of 
the research process for the study, a pro forma was distributed to a wide 
range of statutory and voluntary/community-based organisations operating 
within the City to identify additional sources of information at the local level.  
However, such information was not forthcoming and the general impression 
gleaned from follow-up discussions with a number of the agencies contacted 
was that they had only a limited appreciation of the Muslim community.  In 
view of this, this section draws heavily on the 2001 Census data although the 
authors recognise that this information must be treated with a degree of 
caution given that it is now seven years out of date.  In similarity with other 
areas of the country, Newcastle-upon-Tyne is likely to have recently 
experienced a dynamism within the local BME community due to the influx of 
new community groups (such as asylum seekers and refugees) and to 
migrant workers from Europe.  This will have had an impact on the 
composition and diversity of the traditional Muslim community, although the 
nature of this impact is difficult to substantiate in view of the lack of 
information generally about the BME and, more specifically, Muslim 
communities.  
 
Composition 
 
Information from the 2001 Census show that people who described 
themselves as Muslim in the Newcastle-upon-Tyne area accounted for 3.6% 
(9430 people) of the local population.   
 
Table 1 below shows the relationship between religion and ethnicity in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
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Table: 1 Ethnic origin by religious beliefs 
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All people 70.64   0.27   0.64   0.32   3.63   0.45    0.19 16.02   7.84 
White 74.81   0.12   0.02   0.34   0.27   0.01    0.18 16.34   7.90 
Mixed 40.01   0.39   0.66   0.00 22.04   0.26    0.70 25.54 10.41 
Asian   2.14   0.31 13.87   0.03 65.49   9.90    0.12    1.93   6.22 
Indian   5.01   0.00 48.85   0.00   3.36 34.96    0.29    3.84   3.68 
Pakistani   0.68   0.06   0.06   0.06 92.30   0.06    0.00    0.74   6.02 
Bangladeshi   0.23   0.00   0.15   0.00 90.41   0.00    0.00    0.50   8.71 
Other   5.95   3.88   7.04   0.00 62.26   4.98    0.61    6.31   8.98 
Black or 
Black 
British 
63.92   0.00   0.31   0.31 21.58   0.00    0.63     5.84   7.40 
Chinese or 
Other 
Ethnic 
Group 
23.87 11.75   0.31   0.19 18.95   0.00    0.59 37.48   6.86 
Chinese 29.67   9.55   0.16   0.00   0.16   0.00    0.32 52.77   7.36 
Other 15.88 14.78   0.51   0.44 44.85   0.00    0.96 16.40   6.18 
Source: Census 2001 (taken from Newcastle City Council’s Religion and Belief Equality Plan 
2008-2009) 
 
As table 1 shows, the majority of the Muslim population is of South Asian 
origin (65.49%) followed by people of Mixed ethnic origin (22.04%), Black or 
Black British (21.58%), then Chinese or Other Ethnic Group (18.95%).   
 
At a regional level, the Census 2001 states that around 80% of people living 
in the North East stated they were Christian, which was the highest proportion 
in England and Wales. This was followed by people stating they have no 
religious beliefs (11%).  Those who identified themselves as Muslim were the 
next largest group, making up around 1.1% of the North East population, 
compared with 3.1% across the country. 
 
Although the North East is a predominantly white region, the distribution of 
BME communities in the area show some distinct patterns, particularly in 
relation to those of Asian or British Asian ethnic origin from mainly Muslim 
backgrounds (Nayak et al., 2006).  According to the Census 2001, Newcastle 
has the largest group of Asians and British Asians in the North East (6.9%) 
followed by South Tyneside (2.7%), North Tyneside (1.9%), Sunderland 
(1.9%) and then Gateshead (1.6%).    
 
Newcastle City Council’s Religion and Belief Equality Plan also states that the 
Muslim community tend to have a younger age profile and have larger family 
sizes.  These characteristics are reflected in the Census 2001, which found 
that Muslims were the youngest faith community and over half were under the 
age of 25.   
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Community cohesion  
 
Newcastle City Council’s Community Cohesion Strategy (2007) states that 
anti-Islamic feeling after the 9/11 attacks has had an effect on local cohesion.  
The Community Cohesion Strategy refers to an investigation carried out in 
2005, into the experiences of young Bangladeshi’s growing up in Newcastle, 
which found that the racism they experience was more anti-Islamic post 
September 11th.  In addition, the Strategy also refers on Islamophobic chants 
by Newcastle United fans at football games which received considerable local 
and national interest from the media.   
 
Changing population  
 
The dispersal of asylum seekers has also had an impact on the population.  
Figures provided by the North East Consortium for Asylum and Refugee 
Support shows that, at March 2002, there were 1751 individuals and 1091 
households residing in Newcastle (The 2003/2004 Newcastle BME Housing 
Research Project).          
 
Areas of the City 
 
According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (2004) a number of places in 
Newcastle fall within the bottom 10% of the most deprived areas in the 
country.  These include:  
 
• Benwell, Scotswood, Elswick (Inner West; 
• Byker, South Heaton, Walker and Walkergate (Outer East); 
• Most of Blakelaw, Fawdon, and Kenton; and 
• Small parts of Denton and Woolsington. 
 
In 2005/06, 85% of asylum seekers in the area were housed in the Inner West 
or Outer East areas of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
 
There are higher levels of BME communities living in certain wards of the City, 
including: 
 
• Elswick (25.5%); 
• Wingrove (24.7%); 
• Moorside (16.2%); and 
• Fenham (10.1%).   
Source: The 2003/2004 Newcastle BME Housing Research Project 
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Community/Voluntary Groups 
 
There are a number of general BME organisations in Newcastle, as well as 
more specific organisations for the Muslim community.  Advice and support 
often comes from the mosques and their associated community groups and 
Islamic centres.  Examples of some of the organisations in Newcastle include:   
 
• Black and Minority Ethnic Community Welfare Rights Service; 
• Pakistan Muslim Association;  
• Newcastle Mosque and Islamic Centre; 
• Gateshead Muslim Society; 
• Muslim Welfare House; 
• Tawheed Islamic Centre; and 
• Heaton Mosque & Islamic Centre. 
 
A more extensive list of organisations is given in Appendix 1. 
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Chapter 5: Muslim Community Engagement in Newcastle 
 
 
Introduction 
  
For many Muslim communities across Britain, the phrase ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’ (PVE) has translated into a cumbersome blame thrust upon them 
for acts of extremism, not just in global terms but within the Britain most call 
home. It was, therefore, essential that the work undertaken to gather views 
and opinions from Muslims in Newcastle would be based firmly upon building  
relationships with people in order to ascertain an accuracy of feelings as well 
as experiences of ‘being a Muslim in Newcastle’. The Unity Project Steering 
Group had played an instrumental part in allaying potential fears people may 
have had regarding the purposes of our research. But despite this, at times, it 
still felt that the ‘War on Terror’, as coined in governmental terms, was for 
many, a synonym for a ‘War on Muslims’ and that research and community 
work done with Muslims was because they were justified suspects. 
 
The evocative nature as to how any projects associated with the PVE 
Pathfinder Fund could be taken was given great consideration, both in the 
manner in which contact was made with individuals and the manner in which 
focus group discussions were facilitated. 
 
The focus groups concentrated on two aspects of the community, Muslim 
women and young Muslim men. A third grouping, Imams and Mosque 
Committee members, were also consulted but a focus group of delegates 
from mosques was not possible due to logistical complications of not being 
able to bring mosque leadership together collectively. It also must be 
highlighted that the mosques in Newcastle showed little evidence of any unity 
amongst them (for instance there was no ‘Council of Mosques’ type of forum). 
Mosque committee members were also difficult to contact as they were 
individuals, contactable through personal links of home telephone numbers 
and home addresses. Muslim women were relatively easier to make contact 
with. Firstly, through events held specifically for Muslim women by Newcastle 
City Council and, secondly, through invitation to attend study circles held by 
Muslim women across the city. Young Muslim men were identified by 
enterprising youth work undertaken by an officer at Newcastle City Council, 
who was of Asian heritage and had worked with the Asian Communities in 
Newcastle for over twenty years. Most of these young men were referrals 
identified to be ‘vulnerable of falling foul to the law’. They came from socially 
and economically poor backgrounds. They had poor or no school attendance.  
An additional number of young Muslim men were also identified through links 
made with university students with whom discussion meetings were held.    
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Community engagement approach 
 
Originally, the focus groups were designed to discuss areas highlighted by the 
Communities and Local Government ‘hearts and minds’ document with a 
series of questions linked to each section. These were:  
 
1. Promoting shared Values;  
 
2. Supporting and nurturing civic and theological leadership, 
 
3. Supporting local solutions.  
 
4. Increasing the resilience of key organisations and institutions and 
supporting early intervention;  
 
5. Building civic capacity and leadership;  
 
6. Capacity and skills development; and  
 
7. Strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.  
  
Not all of these areas resonated viewpoints from the focus groups and 
required translation into contextual terms such as framing question, for 
example ‘what is it like to be a Muslim in Newcastle?’ and questions regarding 
British or Muslim identity for individuals. Because of the sensitive nature of 
PVE, and the complexity of overlapping issues each focus group was 
facilitated in accordance to what delegates felt were the most pertinent issues 
arising. We, therefore, did not strictly adhere to the 7 discrete themes 
mentioned in the document but have covered all seven to varying degrees.  
 
For a small minority of people a guarantee of anonymity was essential, again 
reflecting the sensitivity some felt regarding the whole PVE agenda.  They 
had concerns as individuals and a lack of confidence in how ‘authorities’ might 
‘identify’ any views that could be viewed as ‘out of step’ with ‘conventional 
views’, despite the fact that these individuals had not expressed any opinions 
which could be considered ‘extreme’ or radical. A reflection, perhaps, of the 
unease which can be levelled at individuals feeling a sense of alienation. 
However, the overwhelming majority of people were very open to discuss 
issues and welcomed the opportunity for dialogue. Many people felt that 
discussions and debates acted out in the media and social forums did not 
portray issues associated with the ‘middle ground’ of being a Muslim in Britain 
today. For example, extreme acts of terrorism and the nature of terrorism is 
readily discussed and analysed, less so the experience of everyday life for 
Muslims. Yet this is of greater consequence and is related to the social and 
economic well being of a community that is not well understood by a large 
majority of the population.  
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Participant profiles  
 
Newcastle’s Muslim communities are ethnically extremely diverse and this 
was reflected in the backgrounds of people who were consulted. This diversity 
is a major factor in the way in which the Muslim communities of Newcastle are 
evolving in the manner they seem to be. Whereas the traditional ethnic 
heritage of Newcastle’s Muslim Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) community 
had predominantly been South Asian (Pakistani & Bangladeshi), this is now 
no longer the case. Not only is there a strong presence of Middle Eastern 
(Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Sudanese, Palestinian), Turkish and Iranian people 
but a strong contingent of European (Irish, German and English) Muslims, 
which has given rise to Muslims questioning and re-evaluating cultural 
customs  and notions of a ‘South Asian notion of Islam’. This was a 
particularly interesting element to the work undertaken with Muslim women. 
Where required the term ‘revert’ will be used to describe individuals who had 
converted to become Muslims from either another faith or from a position of 
no-faith. In the consultations this has been associated mostly with ‘European 
White’ Muslims.  
 
Young men analysed were predominantly from South Asian backgrounds, 
either of Pakistani, Kashmiri or Bangladeshi heritage between the ages of 14-
25, although most of the youth referral individuals were between14-16. 
 
The mosques in Newcastle are based on either lines of ethnic heritage or 
followers of particular schools of thought. However, this is not necessarily a 
rigid rule that excludes the right for individuals to attend a mosque as 
entrance to any mosque for prayers or religious rituals is not restricted 
through any formal mechanism - a practice recognised across the Islamic 
world. The lack of steadfast rules is exemplified by the main Imam at the 
Madina Masjid being of Indian heritage, with a predominantly Pakistani, 
Kashmiri and Bangladeshi congregation. However, in some traditional 
mosques such as the Shah Jalal Mosque the committee and Imam were 
predominantly Bangladeshi, with the congregation also being of that ethnic 
heritage. This has traditionally served to solve linguistic and spiritual needs of 
a community that spoke the same cultural language and followed the same 
Islamic school of thought. The Newcastle University Mosque had an 
extremely diverse range of ethnicities attending, mainly due to the profile of its 
student population. However, many local people also attended this mosque as 
it provided a host of spiritual, religious and social activities, such as Islamic 
study circles and days out excursions. 
 
Issues arising for Muslim women  
 
In total 4 discussion groups were conducted, the first through an event held by 
the Newcastle City Council. In total approximately 80 women were consulted. 
The term ‘approximately’, is used because some women ‘dipped in and out’ of 
discussions. Only a few were ready to provide contact details. The majority of 
Muslim women considered themselves to be practicing Muslims. 
 
 42 
Muslim women in Newcastle are extremely active. They were very much 
committed to better dialogue with non-Muslims and also with Muslim men to 
ensure their rights were upheld.  It was brought to count by experienced 
community workers that the drive by Muslim women for issues they thought 
needed to be addressed was led by a combination of factors. This was mainly 
due to women from various ethnic groups challenging South Asian cultural 
stance on Islamic traditions.     
 
The issues addressed in the focus groups with Muslim women will be 
discussed within the following themes: promoting shared values; supporting 
and nurturing civic and theological leadership; supporting local solutions; and 
strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders 
 
Promoting Shared Values 
 
Many Muslim women had suffered a great deal of racism and Islamophobic 
hostility towards them, particularly since 9/11 and since 7/7. This for them 
undermined any sense of commonality of values that could be promoted. This 
was not only in experiences of racism from individuals but at their place work, 
from the police and also from Council staff.  Numerous examples were cited 
from individuals such as a woman being called a terrorist whilst walking down 
a main street in the City Centre, through to an individual having a home visit 
from a Council Officer and being told to remove the boiler and then being told 
that ‘you lived where you came from without gas, so you can do it here!’. 
Many had little or no confidence in reporting crime. Nobody we spoke to was 
aware of anti hate crime initiatives such as ARCH. The confidence levels 
amongst women we spoke to regarding the police was extremely low. One 
Muslim White woman claimed she had been stopped by the police, whilst 
wearing a hijab (Islamic head scarf), in a place where 15 minutes earlier she 
had not when she was not wearing the headscarf. 
 
They felt the headscarf, which for many was an uncompromising practice of 
faith, was not in line with a prescribed order of ‘shared values’ and that the 
role of the media had further exasperated the position of Muslim women who 
chose to wear hijab. Indeed a few women said that ideally they would even 
want to wear the ‘niqaab’ (full face veil), but felt they couldn’t because of the 
hostility they may face. They felt the concept of ‘hijab’ had been polluted by 
the media and it was misunderstood as a repressive symbol, therefore, 
disregarding any intellectual position Muslim women had on it. The hijab 
identified Muslim women which for some meant they were easy targets for 
discrimination. 
 
At one meeting issues such as the Danish ‘cartoon caricatures’ of the Prophet 
of Islam was raised as an example of the complexity of speaking about 
‘shared values’. It was viewed that there was little consideration of ‘shared 
values’ when it came to religions or cultures that were not based into a 
‘Christian British White’ framework of values. Shared values were ultimately 
associated with a commonality of human values on the basis of mutual 
respect and understanding and required all communities, including the Muslim 
community, to re-evaluate what was meant by ‘shared values’.   
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The question was posed ‘What is life like for Muslims in Newcastle?’  A 
sizeable number of Muslim women felt that discrimination was just a part of 
life living in Britain and that Newcastle was no different. Many of them had 
children who were experiencing racism on a day to day basis, from ages as 
young as 5. Discrimination and racism was seen as a part of life and many 
would not even consider reporting it unless it was extreme. Generally, it was 
felt that their quality of life in Newcastle was good but for the prevalence of 
racist and ignorant attitudes of some people and elements of institutions. They 
felt confidence in establishments such as the Council and the Police would 
help but at present this was not the case. They felt the BME communities 
were strong and resilient. They also felt that the increased interaction 
amongst Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds was challenging the 
traditional ways in which Muslim communities from the same cultural 
backgrounds functioned. This was also challenging a whole host of matters 
pertinent to the way in which traditionally mono-cultural communities 
functioned. For example, Muslim women were now requiring additional 
measures, such as a separate provision for them to attend mosques, which is 
not the case in the majority of mosques in Newcastle.    
 
Muslim women stated they still wanted to live in areas where their cultural 
amenities would be available but also wanted good, adequate housing and 
good schooling. However, they wanted greater education and tolerance 
towards them particularly from people working in prominent positions. One 
woman explained how her son came home from school crying because his 
teacher told the school that Islam had spread by the sword. This was a 
reflection of the barbarism her and others said people associated with Islam 
and questioned the education system in what it was teaching.   
 
In terms of women’s views on whether wearing a Hijab lead to different 
experiences for Muslim women in Newcastle compared to not wearing a hijab, 
the discussion was very revealing.  The ‘hijab debate’ has gained particular 
prominence from comments made by Jack Straw regarding the ‘niqaab’ (full 
face veil). The hijab was considered an important part of Islamic identity for 
many of the Muslim women. Even those Muslim women who did not wear it 
still respected it as an item of Islamic identity. Overwhelmingly, women felt 
that because of the levels of ignorance people had of the hijab, it left them 
targets for discriminatory attitudes and actual acts of discrimination and 
harassment. This had been played out in places of employment and through 
negative attitudes from some service providers. Wearing the hijab was seen 
to impact on the experience for Muslim women, as they felt they would be 
more likely to receive discriminatory experiences.  
 
The question of identity is complex for Muslims, according to the discussions 
held. For most, British identity was not problematic but being viewed as being 
British, by the general public, is about feeling accepted. For some people in 
Britain they view Islam and Muslims as an ‘Eastern’ religion with ‘Eastern’ 
traditions and ‘Eastern’ looking people, which did not fit into a ‘Western’ 
system of values. They felt this concept was deeply rooted in the mindset of 
non-acceptability in some British White people and this alienates some 
Muslims from feeling totally British. They also felt being British was not 
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irreconcilable with being Muslim.  Being a British Muslim was very much a 
part of identity, especially amongst the second and third generation from 
migrant community Muslims. This multiple identity concept is no different to 
the complexity of British identity associated with any ethnic community but 
somehow Muslim communities felt they have to prove their British credentials 
after 7/7 and this point was made  in one-to-one meetings held throughout the 
study. 
 
One Iraqi woman who had lived in Britain for over 20 years felt she had never 
been accepted as British, despite her attempts through learning to speak 
English and trying to integrate to local customs. Indeed, the levels of racism 
she had systematically experienced made her feel rejected from British 
society and she gave an emotional account that she had no home anywhere. 
For her the irony was her homeland, Iraq, was now ‘invaded’ by the country 
she does not feel accepted by.  
  
Supporting and nurturing civic and theological leadership 
 
Mosque leadership was heavily criticised by a large proportion of women we 
spoke to. Firstly, its criticism was based on the fact that the mosques were not 
united on issues affecting the community, such as declarations of moon citing, 
which defines calendar dates such as Ramadan and Eid. Mosque leadership 
were seen to pander to community politics rather than being resolute on 
uniting the community.  
 
Many, but particularly younger participants, felt little confidence in the older 
Imams who had come from South Asia and had little or no understanding of 
English. They felt these Imams were ill equipped in dealing with contemporary 
issues affecting the community, such as youth disaffection.  Many highlighted 
the University Mosque as a good example of how mosques should operate, 
with considered matters for Muslim women catered for and hailed as a 
success in that it was led by young Imams who came from different parts of 
the world. Some concerns were raised that this mosque still needed to cater 
for some of the female congregational needs but it was seen as a better 
equipped mosque than others. The Imam at the Madina Mosque was also 
cited as a progressive young Imam, of whom many spoke highly. Most other 
mosques were seen as being inconsiderate to the requirements of Muslim 
women, with the majority not even having separate prayer space for women. 
 
The Imams and mosque communities were heavily criticised as not doing 
anything to promote the positive images of Muslims and Islam in the aftermath 
of global events such as 9/11, 7/7, the Afghan and Iraq wars. The Islamic 
Diversity Centre (IDC) was seen to be doing more about promoting dialogue 
between Muslims and non-Muslims than mosque leadership. 
 
Civic leadership was considered vital for good community relations. This was 
not only via political leadership through Muslim Councillors but also 
management, which was not necessarily achieved through posts held by 
Muslims but through management which had a progressive understanding of 
Muslims and the potentials for discrimination.   
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Supporting local solutions  
 
There was awareness of local initiatives such as IDC, both because of the 
nature of the work they did but also because they were based in the heart of 
the community.   
 
The police was again citied as the most critical organisation where 
understanding regarding Muslim communities needed to be built up. The City 
Council was also needed to increase resilience, by way of understanding 
Islam and Muslims. Most of the discussions here were heavily weighed with 
examples of poor experiences with the police and with officers of the Council. 
 
In relation to their views on whether people from the community are being 
radicalised by extremists and who they feel is most ‘at risk’ of this, the 
overwhelming majority of people felt that, in their view, people in Newcastle 
were not being radicalised. However, some did feel that British and American 
foreign policy was making people angry, as it was seen as unjust. There was 
an interesting dynamic given that most vulnerable were young people who 
would feel alienated from mainstream society, experience racism and equated 
their experiences to injustices against the Muslim world and then be motivated 
by some movement or organisation. What seemed to be void in this equation, 
for Newcastle, was the lack of any activities from any particular extremist 
movement or organisation.  In some one to one discussions, individuals 
mentioned that certain books which had strong Salafi Conservatism 
associations in the text could be found in local libraries, which they equated to 
influencing young people to become sympathetic to certain hard line radical 
groups. Making organisations and institutions resilient to Islamophobia was 
seen as an essential element of early intervention, as it brought Muslims into 
the fold of society and influenced the cohesion of communities.     
 
Strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders  
 
As a mechanism to deal with the threat of radicalism, the overwhelming view 
was that faith institutions were embroiled in community politics and any 
mechanism to deal with strengthening faith institutions had to be sensitive to 
this. It was also claimed that the Muslim community should itself try to find 
mechanisms from within. However, the Council could play a pivotal role in 
supporting work towards this. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
Muslim women in Newcastle are extremely active and are challenging not just 
the traditional South Asian Muslim communities, but the general community 
by becoming much more active. They are suffering racist and Islamophobic 
attitudes by virtue of the symbolism associated with the Hijab. They are 
confronting, at times, strong negative attitudes towards Muslims by virtue of 
being open targets because of their Hijab. The hijab in feminist term is not 
viewed with any intellectual integrity as a symbol of Eastern feminism but 
merely dismissed as a symbol of male oppression. Many had experienced 
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racist attitudes from front line staff of service providers and from the Police. 
This was leading to mistrust and a lack of confidence toward a host of 
agencies, establishments and institutions.   
 
Feeling British and having a multitude of identities was not problematic for 
Muslim women.  However, for them this was not a guarantee that they are 
accepted in British society. For many there is an underlying profile in the 
mindset of the indigenous British White community that ‘being British’ actually 
meant being British White. 
 
The mosques offered very poor leadership as they were embroiled in 
community politics. Many did not cater for Muslim women to pray. The need 
for Imams and mosque management committees to play a greater role in 
representing Muslim communities in a positive light was felt to be required.   
 
Issues arising for young men 
 
The majority of these young men were referrals to the Youth Inclusion 
Programme and considered to be ‘vulnerable of falling foul to the law’. Some 
of the responses are also from young people who we made contact with 
through the community directly. The referred young men were low school 
attendants or had dropped out of school. Their ages ranged between 15 and 
18. All the young men were second or third generation Bangladeshi, Pakistani 
and Kashmiri heritage. The nature of questioning differed to those asked from 
Muslim women or Imams. In total 3 focus groups were held and 4 one to one 
discussions.  
 
Sense of identify 
 
The participants were asked to consider the following four related questions: 
Do you consider yourself to be British? Do you consider yourself to be Asian? 
Do you consider yourself to be Muslim? How would you define each?  Each 
section of the question was asked in turn with the young men asked to define 
themselves in relation to each.  Overwhelmingly each considered himself to 
be British. Asked to define what this meant, they said ‘speaking English’, 
‘making money’, ‘having a British Passport’ and ‘being born here’.  They all 
also considered themselves to be Asian. This meant ‘family’, ‘religion’, ‘culture 
and background’ and the ‘community where they lived’. Finally they all 
considered themselves Muslim. This meant ‘the mosque’, being a ‘believer in 
religion’, ‘no alcohol’ and to be ‘seen as a terrorist’.   When asked which they 
would consider best defined them, they said Asian and Muslim. This was 
interesting because when analysing what they felt defined each distinct 
identity, British identity was very much associated with a socio- economic 
requirement, such as linguistic tools, passport and economic sustainability. 
Asian and Muslim identities had overlaps of what defined them through 
community, culture, family and kinship. Yet Muslim identity was also tainted 
by the way in which they felt it was perceived by wider society through 
association with terrorism.    
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As with Muslim women, among the young men there seems to be no problem 
with adopting a ‘British’ identity, but again it was within the realms of having a 
multiple identity of being able to say ‘British Asian Muslim’. Asked if they 
would support England in a major sporting event, they all said yes, even if 
England played against their parent’s native country.  When asked where they 
would consider ‘home’ to be, again all considered home to equate to living in 
the West End or Heaton. 
 
The experience of living in Newcastle 
 
In relation to their views and experiences of being a young Muslim man in 
Newcastle, many considered the environment to be dangerous because of the 
presence of drugs and crime. They thought racism was rife and that nothing 
would be done about it, mainly because no-one cares. The police were 
viewed as racist and were thought to not want to do anything about 
complaints made to them. Confidence towards the police was very low. All the 
individuals in our discussions had been stopped and searched by police 
officers, some regularly were subjected to the ‘stop and search’ approach by 
the police. This made individuals feel angry towards authority and have little 
or no confidence in such institutions.  
 
As Muslims, they thought they were viewed by a large proportion of White 
people as terrorists. This gave some young Asian men that were involved in 
crime a form of ‘street credibility’. They also felt that the general public do not 
consider Muslims as British but as foreigners.  
 
The younger age group felt that schools had little or no understanding of race 
and racism. They were seriously concerned that the placement of the new 
Academy was in a white area that they felt was a racist area and could lead to 
racial attacks. They felt no confidence in teaching staff or the police in their 
ability to deal with such matters that might emerge.  
 
Attendance at the local Mosques  
 
Most attended mosque on Friday (Jumma Islamic ‘Sabbath’ prayer), and felt it 
to be an important thing to do but did not really take much notice in the Imams 
talk. They attended, undertook the prayer and then left.  
The only other times they would attend their local mosque would be during 
religious events such as Eid or for a funeral prayer. 
 
Spheres of influence 
 
The issue of whether community elders or mosque Imams have influence 
over young people was discussed.  Generally, family elders were seen as still 
having influence. It was felt that Imams were also influential but not enough to 
keep some young people away from crime and criminal activity. A major 
influence on some young people was the drugs trade. It was seen as an 
escape from poverty and made making money achievable. Some thought that 
the drugs trade was going to get even worse, as the younger generation were 
going to push the barriers of criminality further in order to ‘prove’ themselves 
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to their peers. It was acknowledged that the Asian community elders frowned 
on the drugs trade but turned a blind eye when it involved their family 
members. From this, a concern raised is the disenfranchisement from the 
labour market and what it could mean to this community. 
 
Views on terrorism 
 
The older 19 -25 age group had a view that terrorists were bred through 
global injustices and inequalities. One participant mentioned that young 
people who are angered by society can find an understanding in why terrorists 
do what they do. This was a virtually identical point raised with Muslim women 
at another meeting. 
 
Some of the younger age groups, deploring what had happened in London on 
7/7 felt Imams had influenced young people and believe ‘brainwashing’ is the 
cause.  Others felt that although terrorism had nothing to do with Islam, it was 
necessary in order to ‘do something’ about injustices. 
 
Terrorist activism 
 
The younger men thought that a ‘life of grief’, is ultimately what many thought 
could lead to being involved in an extremist act (e.g. bombing). Further 
translation of this phrase was equated to alienation from wider society. This 
alienation could be economic, from being seen to be victimised by the police 
as well as generally being unable to influence the well being of their family 
and surroundings. 
 
Public perceptions of Islam 
 
With regard to the participants’ views on public perceptions of Islam, the 
overwhelming majority highlighted the negative images portrayed by the 
media of Muslims. Muslims and Islam was seen to be an extreme religion. 
This made young men feel alienated further from White people. Many did 
have white friends, but felt that the element of race was still a predominant 
concern when they viewed white people. Many even had White girlfriends but 
still felt alienated from White people which has been made worse since 7/7 
and the negative associations regarding Muslims. Some used the negativity 
associated with Muslims to give them a tougher image, they felt it could give 
them ‘street respect’ which can be translated as making them look fearless. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
‘At risk’ is an important element to take account when considering 
radicalisation. Who is ‘at risk’ of becoming radicalised is an essential tool in 
tackling extremism. Whereas some commentators have added opinion that 
socio-economic deprivation can fuel angry young men to turn to extremism, 
this is not a conclusion drawn from meeting these ‘angry young men’ in 
Newcastle. Whereas they may be at risk of criminality in terms of drug crime, 
their transition to extremism will not be based on merely socio-economic 
terms. Racism is a major part of their life experience, whether this is at school 
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or from their translation of episodes with the police. Some of them see the 
negative imagery associated with Muslims as terrorists as a badge of honour. 
Again an emphasis is required to better educate schools, civic services, the 
police and employers to become more aware as well as a call for greater 
responsibility from the media.     
 
 
Issues arising in relation to the role of the local Mosques 
 
Background 
  
Although the history of mosques in Britain can be assigned as far back as 
1860, to Cardiff, mosques in our cities today are commonplace and indeed 
can reflect the ethnic make-up of our communities. Many of the most 
established mosques today once acted as communal focus points of worship 
for the migrant communities of the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s, the majority of whom 
were of South Asian heritage. Some of these mosques were converted 
houses, bought through pooling resources from the community. The function 
of the mosque was not just to lead on matters of worship but to also teach 
children how to read the Quran in Arabic, a practice deemed essential to most 
Muslims. In Newcastle there are a number of mosques which have been 
established within communities of particular ethnicity, for example the ‘Shah 
Jalal Mosque’ by the local Bangladeshi community. This had traditionally 
served a community of the same culture a number of purposes such as 
providing a place of worship and religious practice through the commonality of 
language, culture and kinship. In Newcastle, mosques and community 
leadership through mosques have gone through the same experiences 
observed across the country.  Mosques and mosque committees had 
traditionally been extremely powerful within their communities in the 70’s, 80’s 
and 90’s and were controlled by first generation migrant ‘fathers and uncles’, 
many of whom could not speak English. However, as their children grew into 
second generation adults, the legitimacy of their representation of the 
community as well as their lack of ability to articulate matters affecting the 
community was called into question. This frustration translated itself in the 
incapability of any Muslim leadership to deal with more ‘global’ issues 
affecting the Muslim community, such as the Salman Rushdie affair, the first 
Gulf War and the late response to Bosnian Muslim massacres. Feeling 
agitated with weak responses from Muslim leadership some Muslims, 
particularly the young, viewed a crisis in community leadership and many 
started to question and criticise mosque committees and mosque leadership.  
Some commentators have maintained that this crisis created an environment 
which allowed radical messages to be accepted by many angry young men, 
who were not only experiencing inequalities in Britain but saw their faith and 
religion ‘under attack’, their community leadership weak to respond and 
extrapolated their local grievances to the position of the global ‘plight’ Muslims 
found themselves in across the world.  
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In Newcastle, as is the case with a large proportion of mosques in Britain, 
mosque leadership through its committee members can be embroiled in 
community politics. Community politics can be defined as matters associated 
with clan or ‘Biradari’ structures which have origins from where these 
communities originate, which for many is in South Asia. This can act as a 
barrier to co-operation between mosques, almost as much as ‘theological’ 
differences from following different schools of thought. Some of the ways of 
strengthening mosque leadership and assisting the process of inter-mosque 
co-operation is by employing Imams who can speak in English and are 
encouraged to play a significant part of community cohesion initiatives. In 
Newcastle a good example of where this is happening could be cited at the 
Madina Masjid. This mosque has a young Imam who speaks in English and 
engages with a cross section of the community. He also plays an active role in 
youth development activities.  
 
Findings 
 
Unfortunately, and despite numerous attempts, not all mosques were 
forthcoming in agreeing to be involved in the consultation exercise. This may 
have been due to a number of legitimate factors and not necessarily due to a 
lack of wanting to co-operate. 
 
Committee members of a prominent mosque and a local Imam were 
interviewed. Their details are available from the research team but for 
purposes of this report their identity is anonymous. They were extremely 
honest and open and were an important asset of information. 
 
Mosques as vehicles of community leadership  
 
Mosque leadership was associated with the immediate vicinity of the 
community where congregations came from. However, the leaderships were 
not influential in anything more than providing spiritual guidance. The lack of 
unity amongst mosques was acknowledged. This was seen to be inherently 
due to the various schools of thought influencing each mosque, as well as the 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds people forming the mosques came 
from. Another element of criticism that figured prominently was that amongst 
the various mosque committees, ‘they all want to be leaders of the 
community’, and so this hindered any potential co-operation that could take 
place. It was also viewed that a problem for the Muslim community had been, 
that traditionally the community had imported Imams from Asia, and that these 
individuals were ill equipped to know how to deal with issues affecting British 
Muslim communities. Also, because these Imams had little or no command of 
English, they alienated themselves from young people.  
 
Issues affecting Muslim communities in Newcastle 
 
Poor attitudes towards Muslim people were considered a major issue, 
particularly after 9/11.  However, they did not generally accept that Newcastle 
was any better or worse that any other place in Britain when it came to 
negative attitudes towards Muslims. Much of this was seen to be due to 
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British foreign policy as well as negative media and simplistic explanations of 
the complexity of radicalism.  Racism and Islamophobia were now intertwined 
for many people, highlighted in the way the term ‘Paki’ was now deemed a 
derogatory term for Muslims. 
 
Views on the factors influencing radicalism 
 
This was not considered to be simple to answer as the matter was complex. It 
was viewed that Muslims were being ‘provoked’ to always explain themselves 
rather than dealing with the root causes of why people may feel angry with 
British or American foreign policy, which was readily associated with acts of 
terrorism. However, it was important to acknowledge that there was a 
difference between being angry at the political position of foreign policy and 
becoming an extremist and bombing innocent people. The promotion of Islam 
through radical Islamic movement, could give young angry Muslims 
justification to sympathise with the extremist agenda. 
 
Tackling extremism 
 
It was deemed essential to ensure alienation of communities was tackled, in 
particular, through engagement with young people. Engagement would 
require skilled individuals and not just done tokenistic. ‘DEEN’ was highlighted 
as an organisation undertaking activities with young people. Schools were 
also viewed important to play a role. It was considered that if young people 
had positive experiences at school of different people, then this would have a 
positive impact on them. It was also highlighted that many young people were 
not interested in terrorism.  
       
Preventing Violent Extremism: Prevention or Cure? 
 
The PVE agenda has, understandably, been subject to debate regarding the 
balance that should be made between matters of security and the threat to 
citizens and a model of engagement and development with our communities.  
A recent document by the CLG ‘Next Step For Communities’, goes beyond 
the ‘Prevent’ strategy published earlier to detail how the engagement with and 
empowerment of Muslim communities is an essential tool in the fight against 
terrorism. Although the need for better security is an essential requirement 
and must not be compromised, this has to be complimented with robust 
strategies and initiatives which will engage, empower and develop our 
communities to live and work with each other and tackle collectively 
inequalities and some of the grievances faced by our communities.  Indeed, 
the CLG emphasises and recognises ‘solely security based responses’ will 
not counter the threats we face from radicalism. 
 
In November 2001, when George W Bush said ‘You are either with us or 
against us’, this was used by radical groups to emphasise and give currency 
to the ‘them and us’ message based on inequalities and grievances Muslims 
felt. The best way to tackle this is by ensuring a sense of belonging is fostered 
and actively promoted. This would mean tackling the social, economic and 
institutional inequalities that occur and are at the heart of some of the 
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grievances felt by Muslims. If greater emphasis to the response to terrorism is 
given to security, then this will encourage a mindset of alienation and 
exclusion and would be counter-productive. In our engagement with Muslims 
in Newcastle, they had grievances of how they were perceived by non-
Muslims, the media, public services and the police. However, the rejection of 
extremism from within the Muslim communities will not take place through 
merely having cohesive communities. An essential element is the democratic 
and political empowerment of these communities. Muslim communities 
require faith in the democratic system to be responsive to their grievances. 
They need to be confident that their politicians will listen and be committed to 
tackling some of the legitimate grievances they have.  
 
Newcastle’s Muslim communities are multi-ethnic and are successful 
examples of how community cohesion can work. The largest mosques 
operating in the city are multi-ethnic and, therefore, provide a great resource 
to the city in understanding how community relationships between diverse 
ethnic groups can be harmonised.  
 
Since the McPherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence highlighted 
the phenomenon of ‘Institutional Racism’, an analysis needs to be made as to 
how this impacted on the development of institutions and services in 
Newcastle. Barriers to progression and institutional cultures need to be 
constantly reviewed to enable a greater sense of belonging amongst Muslims 
in civic life. 
 
In Newcastle, a response to the ‘Prevent’ strategy based on the CLG 
document approach would produce greater results in ensuring its Muslim 
communities exclude messages of extremism and see themselves as a 
valuable part of British society.  
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Chapter 6: Emerging themes and recommendations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This final chapter provides a summary of the main themes emerging from the 
consultations with the Muslim community in Newcastle.  It also provides an 
overview of the current national policy context relevant to the study.  The 
chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for action and suggested 
research priorities for the future. 
 
Prior to discussing the emerging themes it is important to re-iterate an earlier 
point in the report concerning interpretation of the findings from the 
consultation exercise on the extent to which those views may or may not be 
representative of the Muslim community in Newcastle.  The number of 
individuals who participated in the focus groups and personal interviews was 
relatively small and they were by and large, self-selecting.  The limited time 
frame available for the empirical work made it difficult to pursue a more 
inclusive approach and engage with a larger number of community members.  
Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the subject under discussion could have 
deterred particular individuals from taking part in the consultations whose 
voices are of equal importance as those presented in this report.  That having 
being said, the study has identified a number of issues which are likely to 
reflect some of the views of the wider Muslim community. 
 
 
Emerging themes 
 
Before addressing the specific themes identified by the three community 
groups consulted: young people, women and those representing the 
mosques, it is worth highlighting issues which were found to be common 
across these three groups.  First, the consultations with key stakeholders and 
service providers during the initial stages of the study revealed a lack of 
knowledge of the local Muslim community and more generally, the BME 
community.  This lack of awareness of the characteristics, needs and 
aspirations of the Muslim community invariably impacts on the provision of 
services to this section of the community.  Secondly, there was a wealth of 
evidence that racism and Islamophbia was a significant problem for many 
within the Muslim community and that it was encountered within a wide range 
of situations.  The perceived discriminatory practices undertaken by some 
organisations towards the Muslim community was also noted.  Thirdly, a 
general comment was made by community members concerning their 
perception of the lack of equality of opportunity in terms of both accessing 
services and the extent to which services fully responded to their needs.  
Specific examples quoted included access to social housing and the 
education system.  Fourthly, community members generally characterised 
their relationship with the police as being poor and furthermore, felt that the 
police generally had a negative perception of the Muslim community and that 
this greatly influenced their dealings with the community and especially, their 
interactions with young Muslims.  Fifthly, unlike some Muslim communities in 
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other parts of the country, the Muslim community in Newcastle generally felt 
that there was a lack of community leadership within the community itself with 
the mosques not seeing themselves as fulfilling such a role.  The absence of 
strong leadership led many within the community feeling that their interests 
and concerns were not adequately represented either within or outside the 
community.  Sixth, there was an overwhelming recognition among those 
consulted that they regarded themselves as being British and did not feel that 
this conflicted with their identify as a Muslim and they were generally 
comfortable with the dual identify of a ‘British Muslim.’  Seventh, a great deal 
of concern was expressed about the perception of the Muslim community by 
the wider community, especially the White majority.  A lack of understanding 
of the significance of culture and dress for Muslims by the wider community 
had lead to instances of racist behaviour based on negative stereotypical 
views of Muslim extremists.  Finally, and associated with this latter point, a 
general level of ignorance was described to exist among the wider community 
(and to some extent this was also evident among some service providers) 
about the degree of ethnic and cultural diversity among the BME community 
in Newcastle.  Again, this impacts on the ability of services to be responsive to 
the specific needs and aspirations of the different ethnic and cultural groups 
and reinforces the point made above concerning problematic access to 
services and equality of opportunity. 
 
In addition, to these common issues which were identified across the 
consultation groups, specific issues relating to the three community groups 
consulted were also identified and these will now be discussed in turn. 
 
Muslim women 
 
The women consulted felt that the wider community had a negative perception 
of Muslim women, especially those who wore the traditional dress with such 
women being perceived as repressed which was associated with potential 
extremist views.  This had lead to instances of racism towards this section of 
the Muslim community.   
 
The women also felt that the mosques in the city, being male dominated,  
were not receptive to women and that the opportunities to engage in 
theological debate with those involved in the mosques and have any influence    
were limited.  However, the women were not necessarily advocating a more 
direct or formal role within the activities of the mosques (e.g. by joining the 
mosque committee) but rather that the mosques become more inclusive in 
their approach. 
 
A sense of exclusion from opportunities for influence was also extended to 
local democratic practices and civil life generally.  Again, such forums were 
seen as being male dominated with a lack of opportunity for women to 
express their views or enter into informed debate.  Hence, there was a 
general sense that Muslim women were very much on the periphery of 
structures which enabled Muslim women’s views to be taken into account: 
women did not feel empowered to enter such structures but rather relied on 
more informal groups and networks of like minded women to discuss issues 
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pertinent to themselves.  However, such voices generally remained outside 
the formal mechanisms of influence and there was a call for greater 
recognition of the potential contribution that Muslim women could make both 
in terms of their views on theology and more widely in relation to the role of 
Muslim women in British society.  
 
It was felt that Muslim women were embracing of the idea of multi-ethnicity 
among the Muslim community and it was felt that this greater diversity could 
challenge some of the old cultural traditions of Muslim values. 
 
Young people 
 
Young Muslims tended to regard racism towards them as part of their ‘way of 
life’ in that they experienced such behaviour and attitude from a relatively 
young age and in a wide range of situations.  In part, such racist behaviour 
was seen as permeating from a perception among the wider community that 
all Muslims were extremists or at least had the potential to become so.  Some 
of the young Muslims appeared to embrace the label of being a possible 
terrorist as it gave them status and a sense of importance.  This reflects, in 
part, the lack of positive role models for young Muslim men from within their 
community (noted by the lack of community leadership as highlighted earlier).  
The absence of such role models has meant that some young Muslims have 
been strongly influenced by their peers and sought to gain a degree of 
personal prestige by being involved in anti-social and criminal activities as a 
way of defining themselves: there is evidence of the involvement of young 
Muslims in drug selling and petty crime.   
 
Relationships with the police were felt to be poor and young Muslims 
expressed a sense of mis-trust of the police.  In some cases, this was felt to 
reflect the heavy-handed approach that some elements of the police had 
towards young Muslim men: ‘stop and search’ being an example of this.  This 
lack of confidence in the police also extended to other public bodies in that 
they were not seen as responding to the needs of this section of the Muslim 
community.  Many of the young people felt alienated from the local democratic 
processes that existed with little opportunity to voice their concerns.  This 
further enhanced their desire to make themselves more ‘visible’ and ‘be 
heard’ through involvement in a range of anti-social activities.    
 
Mosques 
 
In Newcastle, mosques have always and continue to be an important 
cornerstone of Muslim life however they are only part of a mosaic of influential 
elements to the community, such as family, ‘biradari’ (clan), and peer 
pressure amongst the young. Mosques primarily provide spiritual and religious 
guidance, but they have been criticised for being weak in community 
leadership, reflected in a lack of collaboration between mosques in matters 
affecting Newcastle’s Muslim communities as a whole. In the discussions, we 
have had with Mosques, they have welcomed consultation regarding 
Preventing Violent Extremism, but they would not see themselves as central 
to addressing such issues. Again, they place emphasis on greater overall 
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dialogue between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Although the 
simplistic national portrayal of recruiting extremists is played out as being 
attributed to the role of mosques, this is not cited as the case in the Newcastle 
mosques. The PVE Agenda is viewed as an opportunity to bridge gaps 
between the Muslim and non Muslim communities and a chance for the 
Muslim community to be viewed as an extremely valuable contributor to 
British society. 
 
Imams play a key role in improving relationships, not just between the 
mosque and civic institutions, but also with young Muslims who may be 
searching for strong identity to define their position within their faith and their 
kin. The role of the mosque was perceived by the Muslim community to be as 
theological leader, rather than a social enterprise. However, there was a 
desire to enhance the latter through dynamic Imams who could converse in 
multiple community languages, especially English, and be able to understand 
issues affecting contemporary Muslim communities.   
 
Any approach to effectively address the objectives of PVE must not be 
targeted directly and solely through mosques. Mosques should be viewed as 
just one of the elements of Muslim life. Not all Muslims attend mosques. In 
addition, Muslims who feel marginalised by society may not attend Mosque 
study circles or religious gatherings either.  
 
Civic institutions should work alongside Mosque committees and Imams, but 
understand that as with any organisational structure ‘committee members’ or 
‘operational leadership’ dynamics and influence of power will differ from 
organisation to organisation. Similarly, any two mosques may differ in whether 
it would be more beneficial to work directly with an Imam or with the mosque 
committee. Generally, it is the Imam who leads on influence associated with 
matters of faith and religion. Committees generally have greater influence on 
matters regarding the administration of the mosque. 
 
 
Current National Policy Context 
 
In June 2008, the Home Office produced the Prevent Strategy and it’s 
strategy for delivery. The Prevent Strategy is one of four areas in the 
Government’s Contest counter-terrorism strategy, which focuses on, and is 
underpinned by, five strategic and two enabling objectives.  These objectives 
are: 
 
• to undermine extremist ideology; support mainstream voices; 
 
• to disrupt those who promote violent extremism; strengthen vulnerable 
institutions in the UK; 
 
• to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent 
extremists;  
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• to increase the resilience of communities to engage with and resist 
violent extremists; 
 
• to effectively address grievances;  
 
• to develop understanding, intelligence, analysis and evaluation; and 
 
• to improve strategic communications. 
 
Following the publication of ‘Prevent’, the Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) produced a document entitled ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism - Next Step for Communities’. This document has a vision 
enshrined within the principles of community cohesion, where a ‘sense of 
belonging’ and ‘shared values’ are central to a way forward in tackling 
extremism. It recognises that a solely security based response would not be 
appropriate in dealing with the threat of extremism. The DCLG document 
places an emphasis on consultation and engagement as a manner to address 
the underlying inequalities that can add to the alienation of individuals and 
make them susceptible to voices of extremism. Our findings would resonate 
strongly with this course of action.  
 
At a local level, there seems to be issues surrounding the whole notion of 
‘shared values’ and whether there is enough understanding or interaction 
between communities to facilitate an understanding of ‘shared values’.  
Muslims we spoke to largely recounted their experiences with White non-
Muslims as negative, blighted by ignorance, racism or institutional racism. A 
PVE strategy, with an emphasis on security, will alienate and isolate the 
Muslim community and will encourage a mindset of ‘them and us’, making the 
environment rife for radical views on ‘western society as unfair and unjust’ to 
be embraced.   
 
The democratic system requires some deliberation into how it is translated by 
the Muslim community. Many we spoke to felt disillusioned with not being able 
to influence policy at local or particularly at national level. This became all the 
more frustrating when, as a community, they were having to deal with the 
fallout of, for instance, foreign policy, such as the Islamophobia many had to 
endure during the invasion of Iraq. This makes it particularly difficult for the 
community to voice grievances. Furthermore, it has a detrimental impact in 
the notion of feeling belonged, which is given such prominence in the CLG 
document cited above. 
 
Amongst some Muslims living in local communities of Newcastle, there is still 
a mistrust associated with the PVE agenda. Since the events of 9/11, many 
have had negative experiences and would equate themselves to having 
adopted a siege mentality, always under scrutiny by institutions, the police, 
the media and a proportion of the non Muslim community. This can only be 
addressed by strategies ensuring resilience is installed by making Muslim 
communities feel a part of Newcastle as a whole, by ensuring barriers 
between communities are removed and replaced by trust and understanding. 
By tackling institutional and societal inequalities and bringing together all 
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communities through a model of shared values and mutual respect a sizeable 
impact can be made on any potential threat posed by extremist ideologies. 
Building upon this, there can be scope for the Muslim community to become 
more engaged in democratic systems, empowering itself to voice grievances. 
The PVE agenda has to be trusted by the Muslim community if it is to be 
effective. Its success is largely dependant on a strategy which is based on the 
principles of community empowerment and engagement as is highlighted in 
the approach made by the DCLG, a perspective which is underlined by the 
work undertaken in Newcastle.    
 
 
Recommendations 
 
On the basis of the work undertaken for this project and the evidence 
gathered, the research team would suggest a number of recommendations 
that could build on this study and develop the themes identified in this report. 
 
The proposed recommendations are as follows: 
 
1. The opportunity for securing more longer-term funding from central 
government for this programme would necessitate the development of a 
strategic framework which should provide a clear direction for the future 
funding of local initiatives under the programme.  This will require the 
development of a series of explicit objectives for the programme which 
would need to be closely linked with achievable and expected outputs and 
associated timescales.  In this way, the allocation of future funding is 
undertaken on a strategic rather than ad hoc basis.  This would also 
provide all stakeholders, including the Muslim community, with a detailed 
appreciation of the focus of the framework and encourage dialogue about 
this.   
 
Within the context of this strategic framework a number of issues arising from 
this study should be addressed: 
 
• Investigation of the level of understanding and perception among 
service providers towards the Muslim community and the BME 
community generally.  Consideration should also be given to the 
development of ‘community profiles’ i.e. an overview of each ethnic 
group which details their main characteristics and particularly, 
highlights those aspects of their culture, ethnic origin and religious 
beliefs which are unique to that group.   This information could then be 
used by service providers at both a strategic and operational level to 
inform their relationships with members of the particular communities 
concerned.  Salford City Council had embarked on such a programme 
and has actively involved the communities themselves in defining and 
compiling the material to be included in the community profile 
document. 
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• Further work needs to be undertaken to fully understand the perception 
of Muslims in Newcastle by the wider community and particularly, how 
such perceptions are formulated and reinforced; 
 
• Investigation should be undertaken to determine the extent to which 
equality of opportunity exists for the Muslim community in relation to 
access to services; 
 
• A review of existing community consultation and engagement 
approaches and methods to ensure that they are inclusive of the 
Muslim community, facilitate representation from the various sections 
of the community and are deemed to be relevant to their interests; 
 
• Work with Imams to facilitate greater collaboration between the 
mosques and build capacity among key individuals to enable them to 
embrace community leadership roles.  Particular emphasis should be 
given to identifying common issues across the various mosques which 
would facilitate greater collaboration; 
 
• Evaluate the extent to which the Muslim community has developed a 
‘sense of belonging’ both on a spatial level, through attachment to their 
community, and in terms of their self-identification as being British.  
Further work should be undertaken to assess what this sense of 
belonging means for inter-generational relationships within the Muslim 
community and in terms of their interactions with the wider community. 
 
2. In recognition that not all aspects of the original study brief have been 
considered in detail, it is recommended that additional work is undertaken 
to investigate the following: 
 
• The nature of inter-generational relationships within the Muslim 
community and the impact of these in relation to community leadership 
and the activities and behaviour of young people; 
 
• The degree of community dynamism within traditional Muslim 
community areas as ‘new’ communities (e.g. asylum seekers and 
refugees and migrant workers) settle in the area.  What impact does 
this greater ethnic and cultural diversity have on the sense of 
‘community’ for Muslims and for community cohesion and integration 
generally; 
 
• The perception of relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims and 
particularly the White British.  To what extent are these relationships 
based on positive views, such as ‘shared values’ rather than negative 
ones, such as suspicion and ignorance.  
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The way forward: Further research 
 
On the basis of the research undertaken for this study, the issues arising and 
the wider premise of the original study brief, we would advocate the need for 
further research in relation to the following: 
 
• Inter-generational relationships between young Muslims and their 
parents and how this impacts on community influence, sense of self, 
community attachment, informal support networks and avenues for 
grievance for young people; 
 
• The views of the Muslim community in areas where there has recently 
been a high degree of transience (reflective of the recent influx of 
migrant workers and asylum seekers/refugees) towards community 
cohesion and community and personal safety; and 
 
• The level of understanding among the White British community towards 
the Muslim community and how perceptions and stereotypes are 
established and reinforced.  The emphasis should be on different White 
British communities, differentiated according to spatial patterns of 
settlement (i.e. those living in ethnically diverse areas of Newcastle 
compared with those living in predominantly White only areas).  
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Appendix 1: List of organisations 
 
Organisation Address 
Shahjalal Mosque 
26-28 Sceptre Street, Heaton, Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
NE4 6PQ 
Heaton Mosque 
1 Rothbury Terrace, Heaton, Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
NE6 5XH 
Madina Majid Mosque 
4-36 Wingrove Gardens, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 9HS 
Heaton Mosque 
1 Rothbury Terrace, Heaton, Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
NE6 5XH 
EMTEP 
136 West Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 9QA 
NESCA 
234 Stanton Street, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 5LJ 
Millin Centre 
160-164 Ellesmere Rd, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 8TR 
Shi'a Mosque 
52a Wingrove Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 9BQ 
Malvern St Mosque 
4 Malvern Street, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 6SU 
Al Raza Mosque 
98 Stanton Street, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 5LE 
DEEN 
72 Sceptre Street, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 6PR 
Newcastle Muslim Centre 
Bentinck Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 6UX 
Muungano Community 
Association 
51 Church Road, Gosforth, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE3 1UE 
Wadajir Group 
87 Monday Crescent, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 5BG 
Bentinck TARA & Community 
House 
90-100 Durham Street, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 6XQ 
Newcastle Bangladesh 
Association 
39 Cotswold Gardens, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE7 7AE 
Newcastle Bangladeshi Youth  
Forum 
17 Cliftonville Avenue, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 8RT 
Arthur's Hill Asian Residents 
Association 
7 Belsay Place, Arthur’s Hill, Newcastle 
upon Tyne. NE4 5NX 
 
Pakistani Muslim Association 
4 Warenford PlC, Newcastle upon Tyne  
NE5 2ED 
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Sudanese Community Group 
Heaton Library, Heaton Park View, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 5AH 
Turkish Community 
Association 
35 Grainger Park Road, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 8SA 
Arabic Women's Group 
10 Dilston Road, Fenham, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 5NP 
Bangladeshi Women's Group 
Callerton House, Callerton Place, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, NE4 5NQ 
Bangladeshi Community 
Centre and Mosque 
246 Elswick Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 6SN 
Newcastle Central Masjid 
Grainger Park Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 8RR 
Iranian Mosque 
Bentinck Road, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE4 6UT 
Turkish Mosque 
35 Grainger Park Road, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE4 8SA 
Newcastle University Mosque 
King George V Building, King’s Road, 
Northumberland Building, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
NE1 7RU 
Northumbria University 
Mosque 
Prayer Room, Ground Floor, Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
Bangladeshi Association 
9 Willerby Drive, Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE3 5LL 
Kiran Group 
Office 4 Cookery Block Heaton Education 
Centre, Trewhitt Road, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, NE6 5DY 
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